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INTRODUCTION 
t its 2013 Annual Conference, the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association’s (NCAA) Division I Board of Directors (“Board of 
Directors”), an eighteen-member body consisting of college 
presidents, athletic conference commissioners, and athletic directors,1 
considered twenty-six proposals recommended for adoption by the 
NCAA’s Rules Working Group.2 The Rules Working Group’s 
legislative proposals streamline NCAA rules governing recruiting, 
coaches and other athletics personnel, and awards and benefits.3 More 
than attempting to achieve simplification, the deregulation legislation 
submitted for approval also ushers in a new model of governance that 
reflects a controversial transformation in the NCAA’s governance 
philosophy–from an emphasis on maintaining competitive equity to 
achieving fairness of competition.4 This philosophical reorientation 
presents new opportunities, but also raises concerns that the 
competitive gap between lower-resource institutions and wealthier 
institutions will widen. The Rules Working Group’s legislative 
proposals were also an attempt to accomplish the fulfillment of the 
Board of Director’s charge to fashion rules that support NCAA 
fundamental principles.5 At the NCAA’s January 2013 Annual 
	
1 NCAA, 2012–13 NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL § 4.2.1 (2012) [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D113.pdf. 
2 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Rules Working Group Makes Final Recommendations for 
First Phase, NCAA.ORG (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public 
/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2012/December/Rules+Working+Group+makes+final+re
commendations+for+first+phase. 
3 Id. 
4 Breakdown of Division I Rules Changes, NCAA.ORG (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.ncaa 
.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2013/January/Breakdown+
of+Division+I+rules+changes. 
5 Matt Casby, Daily Compliance Item–10/31/12–NCAA Enforcement Article: Board 
Adopts Tougher, More Efficient Enforcement Program, DAILY COMPLIANCE ITEM (Oct. 
30, 2012), http://dailycomplianceitem.wordpress.com/2012/10/daily-compliance-item-103 
012-ncaa-enforcement-article/. 
A
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Conference, the Board of Directors approved twenty-five of the Rules 
Working Group’s twenty-six legislative proposals.6 
The Rules Working Group’s deregulation proposals constitute 
another phase in NCAA reform initiatives that are an outgrowth of a 
summit of approximately fifty presidents and chancellors of NCAA 
Division I institutions (the “Presidential Retreat”).7 According to 
NCAA President Mark Emmert, the Presidential Retreat was 
organized as a means of engaging the leadership of college presidents 
to actively address important issues confronting intercollegiate 
athletics.8 Following the Presidential Retreat, the Board of Directors 
established five working groups, each chaired by a college or 
university president, charged with developing legislation that would 
address these critical issues.9 In addition to the Rules Working Group, 
the working groups are the Enforcement Working Group, Student-
Athlete Well-Being Working Group, Resource Allocation Working 
Group, and the Division I Committee on Academic Performance.10 
As noted above, the Rules Working Group’s legislation was 
another stage of an ongoing process that resulted in the promulgation 
of significant legislation, which was adopted prior to the NCAA’s 
January 2013 Annual Meeting. Another outcome of the Presidential 
Retreat was a 2011 directive from the Board of Directors to the 
Committee on Academic Performance (CAP) to “create[] a package 
of proposals aimed at improving academic success.”11 The end result 
of CAP’s efforts were proposals, adopted by the Board of Directors, 
imposing more stringent Division I student-athlete initial and transfer 
eligibility rules, establishing academic redshirt status and increasing 
	
6 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Division I Streamlines Rulebook, NCAA.ORG (Jan. 19, 
2013), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2013/January/di
vision+i+streamlines+rulebook. 
7 Casby, supra note 5. 
8 Hosick, supra note 6. 
9 See Maureen Harty, Kris Richardson & Geoff Silver, 2013 Regional Rules Seminar, 
Division I Rules Working Group: Where We Are Now (May 10, 2013), available at  
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/17420b804f9b80f4a0a5e70bd28aa9b0/Division+I
+Rules+Working+Group+-+Where+We+Are+Now.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID 
=17420b804f9b80f4a0a5e70bd28aa9b0 (identifying the working groups and their charge); 
NCAA, POST-PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT UPDATES (2011) [hereinafter POST-PRESIDENTIAL 
RETREAT UPDATES], available at http://www.nacwaa.org/sites/default/files/images 
/NCAA%20Post-Presidential%20Retreat%20Updates%2010.28.11.pdf (identifying the 
presidents chairing each working group). 
10 See Harty, Richardson & Silver, supra note 9. 
11 POST-PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT UPDATES, supra note 9. 
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the minimum Academic Progress Rate (APR) required for teams to 
qualify for post-season competition.12 
Acting on its charge from the Board of Directors, the Student-
Athlete Well-Being Working Group promulgated legislation that 
included controversial true-cost-of-attendance legislation that would 
permit Division I student-athlete scholarship recipients to receive 
additional aid, up to $2000 above their full grant-in-aid.13 As 
discussed infra, this legislation was adopted but has been suspended 
in light of strong opposition by Division I member institutions. 
Legislation crafted by the Student-Athlete Working Group and 
approved by the Board of Directors includes reform measures: (1) 
affording institutions the discretion to award multiyear grants-in-aid 
to student-athletes, (2) granting institutions the discretion to increase 
the amount of a scholarship award during the period of the reward, 
and (3) removing restrictions on institutions’ ability to provide 
financial aid to former student-athletes seeking to complete 
baccalaureate degree requirements.14 Finally, important reform 
legislation enacted by the Board of Directors prior to the January 
2013 deregulation conference includes rules promulgated by the 
Enforcement Working Group, which substantially revamped the 
NCAA enforcement and infractions process.15 
This Article analyzes the Rules Working Group’s deregulation 
proposals submitted for Board of Directors approval in January 2013, 
as well as the academic and student-athlete welfare legislation 
promulgated by other working groups and adopted by the Board of 
Directors prior to 2013. Deregulation, academic, and student-athlete 
well-being legislation are evaluated in light of the justifications 
articulated in support of their adoption, the likelihood that they will 
achieve their stated objectives, and the extent to which deregulation 
and reform legislation conform to NCAA core principles. In addition, 
this Article explores the impact of deregulation and reforms in 
addressing tensions that reside with intercollegiate athletics—
particularly concerns relating to economic and other disparities 
existing within Division I athletic programs. This Article argues that 
deregulation and academic reform legislation represent important and 
significant steps toward enhancing the legitimacy of the NCAA 
	
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. A discussion of changes made to the NCAA enforcement process is beyond the 
scope of this article and will be addressed in a follow-up article drafted by the authors. 
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regulatory process, fostering student-athlete well-being, and giving 
greater priority to academic values. Although deregulation and 
academic reform represent genuine change, this Article cautions that 
these efforts are only a starting point for achieving greater balance 
between athletic and academic values and greater equity within 
intercollegiate athletics. 
As a necessary backdrop to our analysis of NCAA deregulation 
and reforms, this Article begins with a brief description of the NCAA 
legislative process. As discussed below, the legislation promulgated 
by the Rules Working Group and other working groups departed from 
the NCAA’s established legislative process. 
I 
THE NCAA LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
The Rules Working Group’s twenty-six legislative proposals and 
legislation promulgated by other NCAA Division I working groups 
departed from the legislative process established in the NCAA 
Manual. As envisioned in the NCAA Manual, NCAA Division I 
legislative proposals are initiated principally by the NCAA 
Legislative Council, the NCAA’s primary legislative body.16 The 
NCAA Manual states that the Legislative Council shall “[s]erve as the 
division’s primary legislative authority, subject to review by the 
Board of Directors.”17 In fulfilling its responsibilities, the Legislative 
Council receives input from other bodies within the NCAA 
governance structure, including Division I cabinets and committees. 
For example, the Initial-Eligibility Waivers Committee reports to the 
Academic Cabinet, which in turn may present potential legislation to 
the Legislative Council.18 The Council then evaluates and determines 
whether to promulgate proposed legislation for consideration by the 
Board of Directors.19 Although the Legislative Council is the primary 
NCAA legislative body, the Board of Directors can also initiate, 
rather than merely adopt, legislation submitted by the Council.20 
In summary, the NCAA Manual establishes a legislative process 
whereby the Legislative Council, with input from other bodies, is the 
primary source of proposed legislation to be considered for adoption 
	
16 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 4.6.2. 
17 Id. § 4.6.2(a). 
18 Id. § 6.9, at 25, fig. 4-1. 
19 Id. § 5.3.2.2.2. 
20 Id. § 5.3.2.1. 
DAVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  11:32 AM 
82 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 77 
by the Board of Directors. If the Board of Directors votes to approve 
legislation adopted by the Legislative Council, such legislation 
becomes effective unless it is overridden by a five-eighths vote of 
voting active-member institutions.21 
Following the Presidential Retreat, the Board of Directors imposed 
a one-year suspension of the above-described legislative process.22 
Integral to the suspension was a Board-imposed moratorium on the 
consideration of legislative proposals unless a nexus could be 
established between a proposal and the presidents’ reform agenda as 
articulated following the retreat.23 As envisioned by the presidents, 
legislation would be worthy of the Board of Directors’ consideration 
only if it connected to “the enduring values of student-athlete success, 
the collegiate model, amateurism or fairness/competitive equity and 
[the legislation] must support or advance a constitutional principle.”24 
Specifically, Presidential Retreat participants delineated four 
“enduring values” associated with a collegiate mode of intercollegiate 
athletics: 
Student-athlete success is paramount, both academically and 
athletically. The collegiate model should embed the values of higher 
education, including shared responsibility and accountability; this 
model must be protected and sustained. In the collegiate model of 
athletics, amateurism is the student-participation model that guides 
the relationship between students and institutions. In the collegiate 
model of athletics, the guiding principles should be based on fair 
opportunities to compete among institutions with similar 
commitments to intercollegiate athletics.25 
To facilitate the development of legislation with a nexus to these 
values and NCAA core principles as articulated in its bylaws, the 
Board of Directors adopted a recommendation from the Presidential 
Retreat calling for the creation of the previously-described five 
	
21 Id. § 5.3.2.3.6. 
22 John Infante, Consolidation of Powers, NCAA BYLAW BLOG (Jan. 16, 2012), 
http://www.ncaa.org/blog/2012/01/consolidation-of-powers/; Michelle Brutlag Hosick, 
Board Won’t Consider New Proposals Through 2013–14, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2012 
/October/Board+wont+consider+new+proposals+through+2013+14. 
23 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Convention Will Be Different Experience for DI Legislative 
Council, NCAA.ORG (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa 
/resources/latest+news/2012/january/convention+will+different+experience+for+di 
+legislative+council. 
24 Id. 
25 NCAA WORKING GROUP ON COLLEGIATE MODEL – ENFORCEMENT, FINAL REPORT 
2 (2012), available at http://www.nacwaa.org/sites/default/files/images/NCAA%20 
Final_Report_Oct%202012.pdf. 
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working groups.26 Working groups, each chaired by a college 
president or chancellor, act in concert with the above-described values 
and NCAA principles, consult with the Division I Legislative 
Council, and propose legislation for Board of Directors’ 
consideration.27 
From the presidents’ perspective, the establishment of working 
groups and the circumvention of the typical legislative process would 
hasten the development of legislation that addresses the pressing 
issues facing intercollegiate athletics.28 By imposing a moratorium on 
the normal legislative process, the presidents also impliedly 
recognized that past efforts to secure the development of such 
legislation were thwarted by a legislative process that had become too 
cumbersome. The legislative process also was imbued with proposals 
that focused on discrete issues often only championed by a single 
athletic conference.29 As discussed below in the context of the 
proposals from the Rules Working Group, retreat participants 
believed that the NCAA Manual-prescribed legislative process 
contributed to the proliferation of regulations that were often 
meaningless and unenforceable. 
II 
DEREGULATION OF THE DIVISION I MANUAL 
A. Justifying Deregulation 
At its January 19, 2013 conference, the NCAA Board of Directors 
adopted twenty-five of twenty-six proposals that sought to streamline 
	
26 See 2012 NCAA Regional Rules Seminars, NCAA Division I Presidential Working 
Groups–Rules and Enforcement Working Groups Overview and Updates (May 2, 2012), 
available at http://fs.ncaa.org/docs/regional_seminars/2012/PowerPoint%20Presentations 
/Division%20I/Division%20I%20Presidential%20Working%20Groups%20-%20Rules 
%20and%20Enforcement%20Overview.pdf (discussing creation of working groups). 
27 See id. (describing legislative process for proposals recommended by working 
groups); POST-PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT UPDATES, supra note 9. 
28 See NCAA, POST-PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT UPDATES 5 (2012) (discussing how 
suspending the usual legislative process will expedite the promulgation of legislation that 
focuses on the NCAA’s core principles); Stewart Mandel, Recruiting Deregulation Fiasco 
Underscores Deeper NCAA Disconnect, SI.COM (Apr. 30, 2013, 1:01 PM), http://sports 
illustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news/20130430/ncaa-recruiting-regulations/ (noting 
intent behind working groups was to bypass NCAA’s laborious legislative process); Mark 
Emmert’s Changes to Go Through?, ESPN.COM (Oct. 26, 2011, 9:46 PM), http://espn.go 
.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7152603/ncaa-meeting-agenda-full-significant-votes 
(suggesting the NCAA’s usual legislative process impeded efforts to effectuate meaningful 
bylaw reform). 
29 See Mark Emmert’s Changes to Go Through?, supra note 28. 
DAVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  11:32 AM 
84 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 77 
the NCAA Manual.30 Before examining the NCAA’s modification of 
many of its rules, we briefly review the justifications offered in 
support of the Rules Working Group’s deregulation legislation. 
The justifications advanced in support of deregulation cannot be 
viewed apart from the fundamental reorientation in governance 
philosophy that deregulation both represents and supports. The Rules 
Working Group’s legislation reflects a fundamental shift from a 
competitive equity to a fair competition model of enforcement.31 A 
competitive equity model “sought to place all athletic programs on 
equal footing.”32 Deregulation proponents argue that a regulatory 
scheme premised on a competitive equity model led to the 
proliferation of rules that often defied common sense, were difficult 
to enforce, and failed to enhance student-athlete success.33 The most 
prominent example of questionable regulation often cited, even by 
NCAA officials, is the infamous “Fruit, Nuts and Bagels” bylaw.34 
Under that bylaw, an institution could provide a student-athlete with 
fruit, nuts, and bagels, but providing cream cheese could amount to a 
rules violation.35 The legislation was intended to provide student-
athletes with the ability to receive healthy snacks at their institution’s 
discretion, while placing reasonable limitations on the scope of the 
benefits that schools provide in an effort to maintain competitive 
equity. Notwithstanding the intent behind the rule, the NCAA’s past 
failure to take a common sense approach to the issue effectively 
makes the case for deregulation. 
Another example of this philosophical shift is the recent proposal 
to eliminate the restrictions surrounding printed recruiting materials. 
For years, NCAA rules have regulated these items down to the most 
minute detail. Under un-amended rules, if a coach sends an informal 
note to a prospective student-athlete, the note card cannot exceed 8.5 
by 11 inches when opened in full.36 In addition, the card can contain 
only the institution’s name and logo, but only on the outside of the 
card.37 Any text on the inside of the card must be handwritten.38 
	
30 Hosick, supra note 6. 
31 Id. 
32 Allie Grasgreen, A Recruiting Revolution?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/01/15/ncaa-division-i-rules-would-ease            
-recruiting-restrictions. 
33 Breakdown of Division I Rules Changes, supra note 4. 
34 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 16.5.2(h). 
35 See Grasgreen, supra note 32. 
36 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 13.4.1.1(i). 
37 Id. 
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Similar restrictions are also imposed on institutional letterhead, 
envelopes, media guides, and camp brochures.39 These rules were 
promulgated to eliminate the competitive disadvantage to schools not 
in a financial position to produce the types of recruiting materials that 
might be produced if no restrictions were imposed. 
Rather than focus on discrete rules regulating behavior that is 
better reserved for regulation at the institutional and conference 
levels,40 a fair competition model, as envisioned by the Rules 
Working Group, focuses rulemaking on issues of association or 
nationwide concern–such as student-athlete eligibility, scholarships, 
the length of recruiting and playing seasons, and coach limitations.41 
Rulemaking relating to these issues aligns more closely with the four 
values associated with a collegiate model of intercollegiate athletics,42 
which in turn possess a close nexus to principles articulated in the 
NCAA’s constitution and bylaws. These include, among others, 
institutional control and responsibility,43 student-athlete well-being,44 
ethical conduct,45 sound academic standards,46 amateurism,47 and 
financial aid.48 Operating from a charge emanating from the 
Presidential Retreat, the Rules Working Group set out to give greater 
priority to rules that possess such a nexus and to eliminate or severely 
modify rules without such a nexus.49 
As reflected in the rules revisions that we will discuss, a fair 
competition model also imbues campus officials with discretion50 and 
thus gives primacy to the notion of institutional control on matters 
perceived as being of local control. By vesting university officials 
with greater discretion, the Rules Working Group’s legislative 
proposals enhance the vision and perhaps the reality of shared 
responsibility for rules compliance between the NCAA and 
institutions. Another perceived benefit of deregulation is a reduction 
	
38 Id. 
39 Id. §§ 13.4.1.1(a)–(c), 13.4.1.1.2. 
40 Breakdown of Division I Rules Changes, supra note 4. 
41 Id. 
42 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
43 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.1. 
44 Id. § 2.2. 
45 Id. § 2.4. 
46 Id. § 2.5. 
47 Id. § 2.9. 
48 Id. § 2.13. 
49 Breakdown of Division I Rules Changes, supra note 4. 
50 Grasgreen, supra note 32. 
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of the administrative burden imposed on athletic compliance 
personnel and other university administrators, those who would no 
longer be required to devote resources when they attempt to secure 
compliance with a seemingly endless laundry list of often 
extraordinarily discrete and relatively unimportant provisions. 
From a philosophical vantage, a regulatory structure premised on 
fair competition, rather than competitive equity, acknowledges the 
diversity of institutions within Division I athletics. A justification 
offered in support of the shift to a fair competition model is that 
schools should neither be penalized for natural advantages nor for the 
economic advantages that accrue from variables such as geography, 
facilities, and a larger resource base to support their intercollegiate 
athletics programs.51 
The shift from a competitive equity to a fairness of competition 
model is not without its critics, who argue that the changes to the 
rules will afford additional advantages to the wealthiest athletics 
programs.52 Critics argue that certain rules are apt to expand the gap 
between what has been characterized as the “have” and “have-not” 
programs within Division I athletics.53 This issue has created 
differences of opinion, even within some campuses. Compliance 
personnel decry the cumbersome, time-consuming task of monitoring 
what many perceive as an ever-increasing list of inconsequential and 
unenforceable rules.54 On the other hand, many coaches view the 
deregulation effort with trepidation, as they fear the removal of the 
current restrictions will only exacerbate the recruiting “arms race” 
that has characterized college recruiting in recent decades.55 In fact, 
	
51 Breakdown of Division I Rules Changes, supra note 4. 
52 Grasgreen, supra note 32. 
53 Id. 
54 See Stewart Mandel, Check the Sky for Pigs: NCAA’s APR Ruling the Result of 
Common Sense, SI.COM (Aug. 11, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers 
/stewart_mandel/08/11/ncaa-apr/index.html (commenting on the irrelevant rules that 
consume an inordinate amount of compliance officers’ time); Ronnie Ramos, Division I 
Leaders Call for Sweeping Changes to College Athletics, NCAA.ORG (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2011 
/August/Division+I+leaders+call+for+sweeping+changes+to+college+athletics 
(commenting on the many convoluted and enforceable rules deregulation sought to 
eliminate). 
55 See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Board Suspends Two Recruiting Proposals, 
NCAA.ORG (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA 
/Resources/Latest+News/2013/March/Board+suspends+two+recruiting+proposals 
(observing that coaches’ opposition to some deregulation legislation was based on fear that 
the changes could exacerbate the athletic arms race). 
DAVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  11:32 AM 
2013] NCAA Deregulation and Reform: A Radical Shift of Governance Philosophy 87 
momentum for a legislative override is growing. Since a legislative 
override requires a five-eighths majority, a critical mass of dissenters, 
spearheaded by the coaching community, could overturn deregulation 
proposals that have been adopted by the Board and are set to take 
effect in August 2013. 
Finally, deregulation is perceived as a means of enhancing the 
legitimacy of the NCAA’s regulatory process.56 We now turn to a 
discussion of the Rules Working Group’s legislation. 
B. Deregulation Legislation 
The Rules Working Group’s deregulation legislation will be 
evaluated in the context of the justifications discussed above and, 
where appropriate, the tensions that reside within intercollegiate 
athletics. The Article first examines the Rules Working Group’s 
efforts to streamline NCAA rules that regulate the process whereby 
institutions recruit student-athletes. It then examines deregulation 
legislation relating to personnel and awards and benefits. 
1. Recruiting 
The Rules Working Group promulgated significant changes to 
NCAA recruiting rules, which govern the nature and frequency of the 
activities in which colleges can engage when recruiting prospective 
student-athletes to play intercollegiate athletics. The following 
discussion reveals that deregulation produced recruiting rules that are 
streamlined, more consistent from sport to sport (obviating the 
necessity for exceptions), attempt to conform to modern modes of 
communication, and vest institutions with greater discretion in 
determining the means, methods, and frequency of their recruiting-
related communications with student-athletes. Although deregulation 
of recruiting rules is largely positive in that the rule modifications are 
consistent with the NCAA’s articulated underlying justifications for 
deregulation, the Article will explore the potentially negative 
consequences of changing recruiting rules. 
a. Texting and Modes of Communication 
Perhaps the most notable and controversial deregulation effort 
adopted by the Board is legislation that lifts restrictions on the mode 
	
56 See infra text accompanying notes 280–82. 
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and frequency of recruiting communications.57 In most instances, 
current NCAA rules prohibit more than one telephone call per week 
to a prospective student-athlete or his or her family members.58 
Additionally, electronic modes of communication (e.g., text message, 
Twitter, and Facebook) are generally prohibited under un-amended 
bylaws.59 A similar guideline, which eliminated these restrictions, 
was implemented in 2012 for men’s basketball.60 
While the basketball rule received positive feedback,61 objections 
were immediately raised when the Board of Directors adopted the 
broader proposal for all sports. Central among the objections voiced 
are concerns that permissive legislation will cause coaches to feel 
compelled to constantly communicate with high-school students in 
ways that are not conducive to an appropriate work-life balance for 
the staff members themselves.62 Student-athletes have also been 
voices of dissent. Some athletes argue that unlimited correspondence 
from coaches is intrusive, overwhelming, and unprofessional.63 
On the other hand, supporters of the proposal assert that text 
messaging has become a standard and universally acceptable mode of 
communication.64 They also argue that text messaging is virtually 
indistinguishable from an email in terms of its method of delivery 
(e.g., via smartphone) and level of intrusiveness.65 This is relevant 
	
57 NCAA, NCAA PUBLICATION OF PROPOSED RULES WORKING GROUP 
LEGISLATION–DIVISION 1, at 49–54 (2012) [hereinafter RWG PROPOSALS], available at 
http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/tex/sports/compliance/auto_pdf/2012-13/misc_non 
_event/compliance-publication.pdf. 
58 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 13.1.3.1. 
59 Id. § 13.4.1.2. 
60 Id. § 13.4.1.2.1. 
61 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Rules Working Group Recommends Board Suspend 
Recruiting-Related Proposals, NCAA.ORG (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm 
/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2013/March/Rules+Working+Group 
+recommends+Board+suspend+recruiting-related+proposals. 
62 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Board to Reconsider Texting, Scouting Rules, NCAA.ORG 
(Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest 
+news/2013/march/board+to+reconsider+texting+scouting+rules. 
63 Gary Brown, NCAA Might Call an Audible on Texting, NCAA.ORG (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2011 
/September/NCAA+might+call+an+audible+on+texting (discussing some athletes’ 
perspective that texting is unprofessional); John Clay, NCAA Suspends New Recruiting 
Rules, JOHN CLAY’S SIDELINES (May 2, 2013, 7:03 PM), http://johnclay.bloginky.com 
/2013/05/02/ncaa-suspends-new-recruiting-rules/# (quoting athletes on the intrusiveness of 
texting). 
64 See Brown, supra note 63 (discussing the widespread use of texting). 
65 Hosick, supra note 61; Chris Smith, NCAA Deregulation of Recruiting Texts is Step 
in Right Direction But There is Plenty More to be Done, FORBES.COM (June 18, 2012, 
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because current NCAA rules already place no restrictions on the 
frequency with which email correspondence may occur. Other 
arguments in favor of the new rule are that it (1) alleviates problems 
associated with coaches and other institutional personnel avoiding 
accidental contact with student-athletes; (2) respects student-athlete 
choice because athletes can now better determine to which coaches 
they wish to respond, and the athletes can more freely communicate 
with those coaches they would most like to play for; and (3) arguably 
enables prospects and their parents to make more informed choices.66 
Despite these arguments, there remains significant opposition to 
Rules Working Group Proposal (“RWG Proposal”) 13-3. Opponents 
argue that adopting these measures would increase the work pressure 
on coaches and thus disrupt any effort by them to lead balanced 
lives.67 Opponents also express concern that recruits could be 
overwhelmed by the communications.68 As of the end of the sixty-day 
override period, the proposal had received the requisite number 
(seventy-five) of override requests from member institutions.69 As a 
result, the Board of Directors formally reconsidered the legislation. In 
reconsidering the proposal, the Board’s options included resubmitting 
RWG Proposal 13-3 to the membership in its original form, 
modifying the proposal based on feedback from the membership, or 
rescinding the proposal altogether.70 At its May 2, 2013 meeting, the 
Board suspended RWG Proposal 13-3’s implementation until its 
effect can be assessed when considered in light of other recruiting 
rules changes.71 
If RWG Proposal 13-3 is ultimately implemented in its present 
form, it will usher in a new era in which recruiting could potentially 
operate twenty-four hours a day. Phone calls, text messages and 
tweets could occur without cessation, raising the concerns mentioned 
above. Regardless of what form this legislation ultimately takes, 
	
2:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/06/18/ncaa-deregulation-of           
-recruiting-texts-is-step-in-right-direction-but-there-is-plenty-more-to-be-done/. 
66 Smith, supra note 65. 
67 Hosick, supra note 62. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See Hosick, supra note 62 (discussing the options available to the Board of 
Directors). 
71 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Board Suspends Changes to Recruiting Communications 
Rules, NCAA.ORG (May 2, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA 
/Resources/Latest+News/2013/April/Board+suspends+changes+to+recruiting+communica
tions+rules. 
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perhaps a middle ground can be attained in regard to recruiting 
activities; standard modes of communication could be permitted (e.g., 
text messaging) with reasonable safeguards to ensure and protect the 
well-being of prospective student-athletes and recruiting coaches. 
b. Printed Materials 
RWG Proposal 13-5-a is a second, equally controversial proposal 
aimed at deregulation in the area of recruiting.72 This proposal lifts all 
restrictions on printed recruiting materials.73 As previously 
mentioned, institutions currently spend inordinate amounts of time 
ensuring that strict specifications regarding the dimensions, content, 
and design of printed recruiting materials comply with NCAA 
bylaws.74 Although institutions have encountered difficulties 
complying with restrictions on printed materials, removal of the 
restrictions concerns the membership. Detractors cite worst-case 
scenarios in which some institutions create life-sized personalized 
recruiting visuals and send poster-sized letters to recruits.75 Another 
source of consternation for opponents of RWG Proposal 13-5-a is the 
return of media guide publications,76 which the NCAA banned, 
primarily as a cost-saving measure.77 Coaches and administrators also 
express the concern that deregulation in this area might lead to a 
recruiting arms race that will overwhelm prospects, college coaches, 
and athletics department budgets.78 Cost concerns are not confined to 
schools with fewer resources to devote to their intercollegiate 
athletics programs. The Big Ten Conference, which includes schools 
with significant athletic budgets, such as Ohio State University, has 
expressed concerns that lifting restrictions would lead to an arms 
	
72 RWG PROPOSALS, supra note 57, at 58–63. 
73 Id. 
74 See supra text accompanying notes 34–36. 
75 Mandel, supra note 28. 
76 See Dennis Dodd, NCAA is Just Embracing a Brutal Truth with New Recruiting 
Guidelines, CBSSPORTS.COM (Mar. 5, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://www.cbssports.com 
/collegefootball/story/21817110/ncaa-is-just-embracing-a-brutal-truth-with-new                 
-recruiting-guidelines. 
77 Leilana McKindra, Media-Guide Proposals Affect More Than Bottom Line, NCAA 
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2009, 10:07 AM), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2009 
/Association-wide/media-guide%2Bproposals%2Baffect%2Bmore%2Bthan%2Bbottom 
%2Bline_08_28_09_ncaa_news.html. 
78 Hosick, supra note 61. 
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race.79 Although much of the anxiety is specific to football, it is not 
unique to football.80 
Thus, the revised rules, which remove barriers to these types of 
publications without any limitation, have presented a dilemma for 
many athletic directors. Their schools can either absorb the 
considerable expense associated with publications or run the risk of 
falling further behind in the recruiting arms race. 
Membership concerns relating to amended legislation that removed 
restrictions on printed recruiting materials led the Rules Working 
Group to suspend the implementation of this legislation that had been 
adopted by the Board of Directors.81 Tulsa University President 
Steadman Upham, the co-chair of the Rules Working Group, offered 
the following explanation for suspension of the legislation. 
The working group has taken seriously its commitment to listen and 
respond to the membership throughout this process . . . . We 
understand that reasonable minds differ on some of these 
challenging issues, and we hope that further discussion will benefit 
our student-athletes and theirinstitutions [sic]. We believe that, with 
the help of the membership, we can reach an appropriate 
outcome.82 
2. Personnel 
Institutional staff members have been governed by a strict set of 
NCAA bylaws that stipulate everything from the number of coaches 
on a particular staff to where they are allowed to stand during a team 
practice.83 While the number of non-coaching, sport-specific staff 
members has proliferated over the past several years, NCAA rules 
have primarily permitted only head and assistant coaches to engage in 
recruiting activities.84 As a case in point, routine tasks such as 
reviewing the video of a prospective student-athlete or making 
weekly telephone calls to prospects were required to be performed by 
a countable coach85 rather than other athletics personnel.86 The 
	
79 NCAA to Reconsider Some Recruiting Deregulation, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 7, 2013, 
9:34 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/ncaa-reconsider-recruiting-deregulation-235101250—
spt.html. 
80 Hosick, supra note 61. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 11.7.1.2. 
84 Id. § 11.7.1.2(a)–(b). 
85 NCAA bylaws impose limits on the number of coaches that an institution can 
employ. Id. § 11.7.4. Athletic department personnel who engage in coaching activities and 
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administrative burden imposed on athletic compliance staff and other 
university administrators to ensure compliance with these strict 
guidelines, raises legitimate concerns as to whether the allocation of 
resources was not only unjustified, but also diverted those resources 
away from more serious compliance matters. 
This issue was brought to the forefront when a critical mass of 
head coaches began to make the case that their assistant coaches’ time 
could be better spent assisting current student-athletes rather than 
potential recruits. This influenced the Rules Working Group’s 
recommendation and the Board’s adoption of RWG Proposal 11-2, 
which removed the requirement that a head or assistant coach must 
perform recruiting coordination functions.87 Despite initially being 
adopted in January 2013, however, the proposal encountered 
resistance from a number of member institutions, particularly smaller, 
lesser-staffed programs. These institutions’ concerns stem from the 
fact that, in the absence of legislation imposing strict staff-size 
limitations, the legislation would result in further widening the gap 
between the “haves” and the “have-nots” within college athletics. 
The concerns related to RWG Proposal 11-2 were exacerbated by 
the Board’s adoption of RWG Proposal 13-3, which removed 
restrictions on the mode and means of communications between 
coaches and prospects.88 The combined effect of these two proposals 
is that schools that have the means to do so would presumably hire 
considerable numbers of non-coaching staff whose sole responsibility 
would consist of calling, texting, tweeting, and otherwise using every 
conceivable opportunity to communicate with prospective student-
athletes. Those institutions financially incapable of making the 
commitment to add staff to contact prospects could be placed at a 
significant competitive disadvantage. Assume that an institution 
elected to hire no additional staff to contact recruits and that only 
existing non-coaching staff members would take on these recruiting 
responsibilities. In such an instance, it is highly likely that other 
institutional personnel (e.g., academic advisors, strength coaches, and 
other athletic administrators) could become overly burdened by their 
newly assigned recruiting responsibilities. 
	
off-campus recruitment of prospective student-athletes are considered countable coaches 
in that they count against coaching limits. Id. § 11.7.1.1.1. 
86 Id. § 11.7.1.1.1.1. 
87 RWG PROPOSALS, supra note 57, at 8–14. 
88 See supra text accompanying notes 58–71. 
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As the number and variety of these non-coaching staff members 
has grown over the years, so too has the difficulty of monitoring their 
actions and ensuring that these individuals comport themselves in 
accordance with NCAA regulations. For this reason, this deregulation 
initiative is welcomed by individuals (i.e., campus compliance 
officers) responsible for monitoring compliance with the un-amended 
bylaws. Nevertheless, the substantial opposition to RWG Proposal 11-
2 led the Board of Directors to delay implementing this legislation 
until it can be further evaluated.89 Following a review of RWG 
Proposal 11-2 at its May 2, 2013 meeting, the Board of Directors 
upheld its earlier suspension of the proposal.90 
A second issue specific to institutional personnel pertains to current 
NCAA Bylaw 11.7.4, which imposes limits on the number of coaches 
who may be employed by an institution.91 It also limits the number of 
coaches from a particular institution’s coaching staff who are allowed 
to engage in off-campus recruiting activities at any one time.92 In 
addition, NCAA Bylaw 11.7.4.3 requires that if a coach is replaced on 
the road by another member of the coaching staff, he or she is 
required to return to campus prior to resuming recruiting activities.93 
This stipulation appeared to run counter to the NCAA’s stated cost-
containment objectives. Rather than decreasing costs, the “baton rule” 
increased travel associated expenditures for coaches who were 
required to “touch base” on campus before immediately departing for 
the next recruiting venue.94 This is to say nothing of the time-cost 
involved with such an effort. The Rules Working Group sought to 
address this issue with the adoption of RWG Proposal 11-4, which 
eliminates the off-campus coaching limitation.95 
As discussed above, the primary issue that must be confronted is 
how the membership wishes to address staff limitations. This has 
been an on-going conversation in recent years. If significant 
	
89 Hosick, supra note 61. 
90 Hosick, supra note 71. 
91 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 11.7.4. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. § 11.7.4.3. 
94 Scott Hood, Axing Baton Rule Will Change Recruiting, GAMECOCKCENTRAL (Jan. 
30, 2013), http://southcarolina.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=1466287; NCAA, NCAA 
WORKING GROUP ON COLLEGIATE MODEL–RULES DISCUSSION DOCUMENT–NCAA 
BYLAW 11, at 5 (2012), available at http://media.al.com/sports_impact/other/NCAA-Work 
-group-Bylaw-11.pdf (stating baton rule did not accomplish its objective of containing 
costs). 
95 RWG PROPOSALS, supra note 57, at 21–25. 
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deregulation is to occur with regard to the responsibilities of sport-
specific staff members, reasonable staff limits must be imposed. How 
that is to be achieved is a much more challenging proposition. Past 
proposals, which sought to address this issue, were met with 
resistance often tied to disputes over how to set the appropriate 
number of staff members for a particular sport and which personnel 
should be counted within the established number. For example, 
should peripheral staff members who support specific sports (e.g., 
academic counselors and media relations) count against the coaching 
staff limitation? Should only staff who directly report to a head coach 
be counted? One version of a proposal excluded clerical staff from the 
limit.96 This was problematic because it introduced a potential 
loophole by which a coach could hire an “administrative assistant” 
who would presumably not count against the limit, but could be 
assigned “coaching” or “recruiting” responsibilities. At present, these 
pivotal issues remain unresolved. Yet, they must be resolved as the 
Board’s suspension of RWG Proposals 11-2 and 13-5-a and its 
reconsideration of RWG Proposal 13-3 are indicative of the 
membership’s reticence to move forward with these deregulation 
efforts until there exists a clearer road map for what deregulation will 
mean for institutions and their ability to remain competitive. 
3. Awards and Benefits 
The Board of Directors also adopted recommendations of the Rules 
Working Group that revised NCAA Bylaw 16, which regulates 
awards and benefits received by current student-athletes.97 The most 
significant deregulation efforts pertaining to Bylaw 16 were RWG 
Proposals 16-3 and 16-7.98 Currently, the NCAA provides 
considerable latitude with respect to an institution’s ability to provide 
academic support services for its student-athletes,99 with one notable 
exception. Pre-deregulation legislation permitted institutions to 
provide items such as institutional computers (e.g., laptops and ipads) 
only on a retrieval basis.100 The newly adopted rule permits 
institutions, at their discretion, to provide any student-athlete with a 
computer or any other item it deems necessary for student-athlete 
	
96 NCAA, PROPOSAL 2010-18-A (2010). 
97 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 16. 
98 RWG PROPOSALS, supra note 57, at 90, 101–08. 
99 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 16.3.1.1. 
100 Id. § 16.3.1.1.1. 
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success and development.101 While this is a minor change in 
verbiage, it has a potentially significant impact on institutional 
budgets, and perhaps more importantly, recruiting. This is yet another 
example of the NCAA’s shift from a competitive equity to a fairness 
of competition model of governance. This is the platform from which 
detractors of this proposal have argued. Moreover, it reflects a goal of 
the deregulation process, which is to assess rules in part based on 
whether they support student-athlete well-being. This rule would 
appear to be consistent with this objective. 
In contrast, RWG Proposal 16-7 has enjoyed considerable support. 
The adoption of this proposal overturns the windows of time in which 
teams were required to depart and return to campus in conjunction 
with an away-from-home contest (typically forty-eight hours prior to 
and thirty-six hours following an event).102 The limitation was 
originally intended to minimize class time student-athletes missed 
because of team travel. Under RWG Proposal 16-7, as adopted by the 
Board and endorsed by the membership, standards for the time 
athletes may spend away from campus because of team travel will be 
administered at the campus level. Because most institutions have 
missed-class policies with which their sports programs must comply, 
Bylaw 16.8, which imposed the limitations, was duplicative and 
unnecessary. Therefore, RWG Proposal 16-7 provides a very good 
example of the NCAA’s attempt to decentralize authority for the 
oversight of issues that pertain primarily to specific institutional 
policies. 
On the whole, both RWG Proposals 16-3 and 16-7 appear to 
comport to the NCAA’s core principle of student-athlete well-being. 
To the extent that this legislation, particularly RWG Proposal 16-3, 
will further the academic aims of the NCAA and its member 
institutions, it appears to be a move in the appropriate direction. One 
could reasonably argue, however, that providing student-athletes with 
state-of-the-art technological gadgets under the guise of academic 
support is neither necessary for the academic success of student-
athletes, nor is it a particularly responsible course of action for an 
association that has previously championed the virtue of cost-
containment. The reality is that athletic departments have limited 
resources. Therefore, if funds are diverted to efforts such as those 
described above, the concern then becomes what other support 
	
101 RWG PROPOSALS, supra note 57, at 90. 
102 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 16.8.1.2.1. 
DAVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  11:32 AM 
96 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 77 
mechanisms currently being funded (e.g., summer school) will be 
sacrificed, and what is the net benefit to student-athletes? With the 
passage of RWG Proposal 16-3, and the resultant decentralization that 
it has wrought, these are now decisions with which each athletic 
department will have to wrestle. 
III 
REFORM LEGISLATION 
Over the past two years, the NCAA has unfolded a legislative 
agenda that has resulted in the adoption and implementation of rules 
aimed at enhancing student-athlete well-being while at the same time 
strengthening eligibility requirements for student-athlete participation 
in intercollegiate athletics.103 The Article next describes these reform 
measures and examines the reasons articulated in support of, as well 
as in opposition to, them. In regard to the latter, the Article will 
address the opposition that led to unsuccessful efforts to override 
reform measures, as well as membership opposition that resulted in 
reconsideration and delayed implementation of other legislation. One 
example is the suspension of a student-athlete well-being proposal 
that would have permitted student-athletes to receive payments of up 
to $2000 beyond their athletic grants-in-aid. We begin, however, with 
a discussion of a reform measure that survived a close membership 
override vote and displaced a longstanding rule, which for forty years 
had limited the duration of athletic scholarships. 
A. Student-Athlete Welfare 
1. Multiyear Scholarships 
A discussion of the contractual nature of the athlete’s relationship 
with his or her college is a necessary predicate to our examination of 
the Board’s adoption of a proposal that grants institutions the 
discretion to award multiyear athletic scholarships. In this regard, the 
express contractual relationship between the student-athlete and his or 
her college or university arises out of the National Letter of Intent 
(NLI); the financial aid agreement; and university publications, 
including brochures, course offering bulletins, written polices, and 
	
103 NCAA Panel Approves Major Changes, ESPN.COM (Oct. 27, 2011, 11:03 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7156548/ncaa-panel-approves-major-scholar 
ship-rules-changes (describing the reforms adopted by the NCAA Division I Board of 
Directors). 
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catalogues.104 By signing a NLI, a prospective student-athlete agrees 
to attend the college or university named therein for a minimum of 
one academic year.105 Thereafter, other institutions must cease all 
recruiting contacts with the student-athlete.106 Following the student-
athlete’s signing of the NLI, the named institution may freely contact 
the student-athlete and publically announce that it has signed the 
student-athlete.107 In order for the NLI to take effect, however, a 
student-athlete must have received a written commitment from the 
named institution to provide athletic financial aid for a minimum of 
one year.108 Without an accompanying promise of financial aid from 
the signatory institution, the NLI does not bind a student-athlete to 
attend a particular institution, and other colleges and universities may 
recruit the athlete.109 
In exchange for the student-athlete’s commitment to attend a 
particular institution, the college or university promises to provide 
athletic financial aid. The financial aid agreement, which formalizes 
the institution’s promise, provides that a college or university will 
extend financial aid to the extent of tuition, required fees, room, 
board, and books.110 Although the precise wording of institutions’ 
financial aid agreements may differ, they all articulate the principle 
that the purpose of institutional aid is to enable student-athletes to 
pursue a program of study and to participate in the institution’s 
educational process.111 
In 2011, the NCAA Board of Directors, pursuant to legislation 
promulgated by the Student-Athlete Well-Being Working Group, 
	
104 Timothy Davis, College Athletics: Testing the Boundaries of Contract and Torts, 29 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 981–82 (1996); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 338 (7th Cir. 
2012) (explaining how the relationship between a student-athlete and his or her university 
is a transaction in which the athlete exchanges athletic skills for academic education, room 
and board); McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811, 820–21 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2013) (defining scholarship agreement between student-athlete and university as a 
contract). 
105 Provisions of Letter Satisfied, NAT’L LETTER OF INTENT, http://www.ncaa.org/wps 
/wcm/connect/nli/nli/nli+provisions/provisions+of+letter (last visited July 21, 2013). 
106 Recruiting Ban After Signing, NAT’L LETTER OF INTENT, http://www 
.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/nli/nli/nli+provisions/recruiting+ban (last visited July 21, 
2013). 
107 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 13.10.9. 
108 Financial Aid Requirement, NAT’L LETTER OF INTENT, http://www.ncaa 
.org/wps/wcm/connect/nli/nli/nli+provisions/financial+aid (last visited July 21, 2013). 
109 Id. 
110 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 15.02.2, 15.02.4, 15.3.2.3. 
111 Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining a University’s Educational 
Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 772–73 (1991). 
DAVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  11:32 AM 
98 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 77 
adopted legislation that modified its longstanding bylaw regulating 
the duration of athletic scholarships.112 In 1973, the NCAA adopted 
legislation that restricted institutions to awarding one-year renewable 
scholarships to student-athletes.113 During the approximately twenty-
year period prior to 1973, the NCAA imposed no limits on the term of 
athletic scholarships.114 Under such a regime, colleges that offered 
extended-term athletic scholarships gained a recruiting advantage 
over institutions that limited the term of athletic scholarships to one 
year.115 In adopting the 1973 legislation, the NCAA reasoned that the 
move was “a response to the actions of athletes who would accept 
athletic scholarships but then refuse to compete.”116 The NCAA 
membership’s 1973 adoption of the one-year scholarship limit has 
also been justified on grounds that it sought to achieve uniformity in 
the scholarship program,117 reduced the competition for athletes 
based on the term of athletic scholarships,118 and reflected a desire by 
coaches to assert power and increase their authority over student-
athletes.119 
Although the one-year scholarship afforded student-athletes limited 
flexibility, proponents of multiyear scholarships argued that any 
advantage derived from such flexibility was substantially outweighed 
by the disadvantages of the one-year limit. A one-year scholarship 
enabled student-athletes to transfer to another college or to 
discontinue participating in intercollegiate athletics without breaching 
his or her contract with an institution.120 On the other hand, the one-
year limit vested colleges and universities with virtually unlimited 
discretion to refuse to renew a student-athlete’s scholarship after the 
end of the one-year term.121 Although the NCAA severely restricts 
	
112 NCAA, 2010–11 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 15.3.3.1 [hereinafter 2010–11 
NCAA MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads 
.D111.pdf (limiting scholarships to a one-year term). 
113 Louis Hakim, The Student-Athlete vs. the Athlete Student: Has the Time Arrived for 
an Extended-Term Scholarship Contract?, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 145, 158 (2000). 
114 Id. 
115 See id. 
116 Neil Gibson, NCAA Scholarship Restrictions as Anticompetitive Measures: The 
One-Year Rule and Scholarship Caps as Avenues for Antitrust Scrutiny, 3 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 203, 220 (2012). 
117 Hakim, supra note 113, at 158. 
118 Id. 
119 Ray Yasser, The Case for Reviving the Four-Year Deal, 86 TUL. L. REV. 987, 1002 
(2012). 
120 Hakim, supra note 113, at 148. 
121 Id. at 164. 
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the circumstances under which a student-athlete’s scholarship can be 
reduced or cancelled during the one-year term,122 the organization’s 
bylaws imposed no limits on a college’s discretion to refuse to renew 
scholarships at the conclusion of the one-year term. 
Critics argue that institutions’ discretion not to renew the one-year 
scholarship elevates athletics over academics. In a practice that has 
become known as “running off,” it is not uncommon for a coach to 
replace a student-athlete viewed as a mediocre athletic talent with an 
athlete believed to have superior athletic skills.123 Unless a particular 
college or university had adopted a policy to the contrary, the one-
year scholarship limit also permitted schools to refuse to renew the 
scholarship of a student-athlete whose athletic injuries precluded him 
or her from continuing to participate in sports. The one-year 
durational limit was also considered inconsistent with the reasonable 
expectations of many athletes and their parents who assumed that a 
scholarship would be renewed so long as the athlete remained 
academically eligible to engage in intercollegiate competition.124 
Finally, commentators argued that limiting the duration of an athletic 
scholarship to one year constitutes anti-competitive behavior 
subjecting the NCAA to antitrust liability.125 
In October 2011, the NCAA Board of Directors adopted legislation 
heralded as shifting the balance of power between coaches and 
players. The new legislation, which was effective immediately, 
permits but does not require institutions to award multiyear athletic 
	
122 Institutional financial aid can only be reduced during the term of the award if the 
athlete: (a) becomes ineligible to participate in intercollegiate competition; (b) entered 
fraudulent information on his or her application for admission, the NLI, or financial aid 
agreement; (c) is subjected to substantial disciplinary action resulting from having engaged 
in serious misconduct; or (d) voluntarily withdraws from a sport for personal reasons. 
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.3.4.2. During the term of an award, institutional 
financial aid may not be reduced or cancelled on account of any athletics-related reason, 
including the student-athlete’s athletics ability and an injury. Id. § 15.3.4.3. 
123 Doug Segrest, College Athletes’ Rights: Some Athletes Lose Their Single-Year 
Scholarships to Better Players, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Oct. 24, 2011, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2011/10/college_athletes_rights_some_a.html. 
124 Hakim, supra note 113, at 172–73; Joel A. Erickson, Multi-Year Scholarships Offer 
Security to Football Recruits, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 3, 2012, at 5B (stating most 
recruits believe athletic scholarships are for four years). 
125 See generally Yasser, supra note 119; Gibson, supra note 116; Alicia Jessop, 
Should Division I Schools Vote to Overturn the NCAA’s Multi-Year Scholarship 
Measure?, BUS. OF C. SPORTS.COM (Feb. 13, 2012), http://businessofcollegesports.com 
/2012/02/13/should-division-i-schools-vote-to-overturn-the-ncaas-multi-year-scholarship   
-measure/. 
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scholarships for up to five years.126 Several universities notable for 
their athletic success, including Ohio State, Auburn, Michigan, 
Michigan State, Florida, and Nebraska announced that they would 
offer multiyear scholarships.127 
Although adopted by the Board of Directors, multiyear scholarship 
legislation barely survived an override vote by NCAA members. 
Critics of the legislation argued multiyear scholarships would (1) 
force new coaches, for what could be several years, to keep athletes 
on their roster who failed to fit the new coaches’ systems of play;128 
(2) give wealthier schools a built-in competitive advantage in 
recruiting student-athletes, given that athletes are more likely to sign a 
NLI with a school that offers a multiyear scholarship than one that 
only offers a one-year renewable scholarship;129 (3) bind institutions 
to honor the scholarship of student-athletes whose athletics-related 
injuries preclude them from playing;130 and (4) provide student-
athletes with little “incentive to work hard and compete year in and 
year out.”131 
An official at Boise State University, an opponent of multiyear 
scholarships, reportedly characterized the legislation as: 
[A] “recruiting disaster” that would encourage a “culture of 
brokering” and pit wealthy schools with larger recruiting budgets 
against their less well-heeled brethren, while also obligating schools 
to long-term commitments that might not make competitive sense. 
 “There is never a guarantee that the incoming student-athlete 
will be a good fit for the program and the institution.”132 
	
126 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §15.02.7. See also Michelle Brutlag Hosick, 
Multiyear Scholarship Rule Narrowly Upheld, NCAA.ORG (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www 
.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2012/February/Multi 
year+scholarship+rule+narrowly+upheld. 
127 Multiyear Scholarships Plan Moves On, ESPN.COM (Feb. 17, 2012, 7:37 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7587582/challenge-ncaa-multiyear-scholar 
ship-plan-falls-short. 
128 Id. 
129 Jessop, supra note 125. 
130 Brad Wolverton, Who Opposed Multiyear Athletics Aid? You Might be Surprised, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 22, 2012, 2:51 PM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/players 
/who-opposed-multiyear-athletics-aid-you-might-be-surprised/29639. 
131 David Frank, Multiyear Scholarships: Why it May Affect You Differently Than You 
Think, ATHLETICSCHOLARSHIPS.NET (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.athleticscholarships.net 
/2012/04/09/multiyear-scholarships-why-it-may-affect-you-differently-than-you-think 
.htm. 
132 Schools Object to NCAA Multiyear Scholarship Plan, USATODAY (Dec. 28, 2011, 
12:25 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2011-12-27/schools-ob 
jecting-to-ncaa-scholarship-plan/52247594/1. 
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Despite considerable opposition, a membership override vote failed 
by two votes to obtain the required five-eighths majority to prevent 
implementation of the legislation.133 Noting the strength of the 
opposition, NCAA President Mark Emmert struck a conciliatory tone: 
I am pleased that student-athletes will continue to benefit from the 
ability of institutions to offer athletics aid for more than one year, 
but it’s clear that there are significant portions of the membership 
with legitimate concerns . . . . As we continue to examine 
implementation of the rule, we want to work with the membership 
to address those concerns.134 
Notwithstanding valid criticism of multiyear scholarships, the new 
legislation enhances student-athlete welfare by affording athletes 
increased security. This in turn will stymie highly questionable 
practices, such as “running off,” that are particularly prevalent in 
football, the sport in which most multiyear scholarships will likely be 
offered.135 
With the adoption of this legislation, some coaches and 
administrators believe that the balance of power with respect to 
athletic-related financial aid is now weighted too heavily in favor of 
student-athletes.136 As a result, many institutions have sought to 
strengthen their position by incorporating a myriad of non-athletic 
related conditions into the financial aid agreement (e.g., compliance 
with departmental rules and policies). Such stipulations would allow 
institutions to impose higher standards for conduct and academic 
performance. This in turn would afford them more opportunities to 
extricate themselves from financial commitments made to potentially 
underperforming student-athletes, even during the period of the 
award.137 
	
133 Wolverton, supra note 130. 
134 Multiyear Scholarships Plan Moves On, supra note 127. 
135 Mike DeCourcy, Proposed NCAA Reforms a Mixed Bag of Genius, Idiocy, 
SPORTINGNEWS.COM (Aug. 11, 2011, 4:45 PM), http://aol.sportingnews.com/ncaa-basket 
ball/story/2011-08-11/proposed-ncaa-reforms-a-mixed-bad-of-genius-idiocy (warning that 
multiyear scholarships are not a complete panacea to the “chicanery” that occurs in college 
sports as colleges may adopt new practices such as attempting to terminate athletes’ 
scholarships for disciplinary reasons). 
136 For example, coaches cite to a lack of reciprocity in that institutions are bound for 
the term of the financial aid agreement (e.g., four years), but no such obligation is imposed 
on student-athletes who can leave their schools at any time. Thomas Bright, NCAA 
Institutes Multi-Year Scholarships, 8 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 180 
(2012). 
137 An alternative perspective would suggest, however, that the paradigm currently 
employed with regard to athletic financial aid is inherently flawed—the assumption that 
the duration of a scholarship award, even if for a one-year term, is presumptively for four 
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Preliminary indications suggest that institutions have attempted to 
restore what some coaches perceive as an appropriate balance of 
power by not offering multiyear scholarships. A 2013 survey of 
eighty-two Division I institutions revealed that “only [sixteen] have 
offered more than [ten] multiyear scholarships. Thirty-two of the 
universities have offered between one and [ten], and thirty-four have 
not offered any.”138 According to the report, the Big Ten Conference 
offered the most multiyear scholarships.139 In contrast, the Big 12 
Conference, which was the only Bowl Championship Series (BCS) 
conference to formally support an override of the multiyear 
scholarship proposal, offered the fewest.140 Officials of prominent 
athletic programs, such as the University of Texas, who have been 
reluctant to offer multiyear scholarships, cite to their unwillingness to 
make long-term commitments rather than financial considerations.141 
On the other hand, prominent programs, including the University of 
Florida, and mid-major programs, including Fresno State University, 
have offered multiyear scholarships as a recruiting inducement or as a 
means of differentiating their program from other athletic 
programs.142 Lack of knowledge by recruits and high school coaches 
that multiyear scholarships are available and the failure of some 
institutions to publicize their availability have also contributed to the 
slow pace of the awarding of multiyear scholarships.143 It is likely, 
however, that as awareness of multiyear scholarships increases and 
athletes negotiate for them, market pressures will force more 
institutions to offer multiyear scholarships. 
	
years. Proponents of this viewpoint advocate for more of a merit-based approach to the 
renewal of athletic aid, such as exists with most academic award programs in which 
renewal of the award is predicated on preestablished performance benchmarks. Such an 
approach would undoubtedly invite criticism as being overly punitive and not in line with 
the principle of student-athlete well-being. 
138 Mark Dent, Colleges, Universities Slow to Offer Multiyear Athletic Scholarships, 
POST-GAZETTE.COM (May 19, 2013, 12:09 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories 
/sports/pitt-big-east/colleges-universities-slow-to-offer-multiyear-athletic-scholarships-688 
205/. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Brad Wolverton & Jonah Newman, Few Athletes Benefit from Move to Multiyear 
Scholarships, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 19, 2013), https://chronicle.com/article 
/Few-Athletes-Benefit-From-Move/138643/. 
142 Id. 
143 Brad Wolverton, I’m Not Sure Why the NCAA and the Coaches Are Keeping This 
Secret, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 20, 2013), http://chronicle.com/blogs/players 
/category/multiyear-scholarships. 
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2. Over-Signing 
a. The Recruitment Process 
Over the past century, the emergence of highly commercialized 
college athletics has been accompanied by an intense pursuit by 
colleges of high school athletes.144 As described by one commentator: 
The pressure to produce winning teams increases efforts to recruit 
for athletic purposes. “Recruiting is the name of the game” is the 
cliché reflecting the necessity to have a team of superior athletic 
ability to win. The important variable is likely to be the ability of 
team members rather than the quality of the coaching or the desire 
to win. The coach’s desire to excel, to do a superior job in training, 
to have players who achieve distinction, all can incline him to 
recruit. Yet, the primary pressure is usually external, from the 
institution or its alumni or supporters, in a “job-is-on-the-line” 
manner.145 
During the forty-plus years since the forgoing view was expressed, 
the athlete recruiting process has not only intensified, but has also 
become more costly as it devours substantial amounts of athletic 
department resources, including a head coach’s attention.146 As 
expressed by a sports journalist, coaches’ “jobs depend mainly on 
convincing high school seniors to sign on the dotted line the first 
Wednesday in February.”147 
b. Revoking Scholarship Offers 
Two types of coach conduct during recruitment of prospective 
student-athletes have been scrutinized. One involves a coach’s 
withdrawal of an oral scholarship offer to a high school student-
athlete under circumstances where it is unlikely the recruit will be 
able to obtain an offer from another college or university. The second 
situation involves the phenomenon of over-signing, where a coach 
signs more prospective student-athletes to NLIs or scholarship offers 
	
144 Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Prospective Economic Interests: Contractual 
Dimensions, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 585, 599 (1994); Libby Sander, For Coaches, a 
Race with No Finish Line, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 9, 2008), http://chronicle.com 
/article/For-Coaches-a-Race-With-no/35721 (discussing the factors that fuel the 
competition in the recruiting process and the negative consequences of such competition). 
145 Harry M. Cross, The College Athlete and the Institution, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 151, 155 (1973) (footnote omitted). 
146 Davis, supra note 144, at 600. 
147 Barry Temkin, Suit Could Chill Recruiters’ Pledges, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 5, 
1993), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-09-05/sports/9309050387_1_bryan-fortay  
-promises-recruiting. 
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than the coach’s college or university can accommodate under 
NCAA-imposed limitations. 
Although a detailed discussion of the revocation of scholarship 
offers is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief examination of this 
practice helps to place over-signing into context. In regard to the 
revocation of scholarship offers, NCAA rules designate specific 
periods, based on the sport involved, during which a prospective 
student-athlete can sign a NLI and accept a scholarship offer from a 
college or university. As noted above, the NLI, when combined with 
an offer of financial assistance, creates a binding contractual 
commitment between the athlete and the institution. During a coach’s 
recruitment of a prospective student-athlete, it is common for coaches 
and athletes to make verbal commitments to each other. The recruit 
will orally commit to attend a particular college, and a coach will 
orally promise a scholarship to the recruit. Given that a binding 
express contractual relationship does not arise until the student-athlete 
and an institution’s representative sign a NLI and an offer of financial 
assistance or an offer of financial assistance, it is not uncommon for 
either or both parties to fail to honor a verbal commitment.148 
The recruitment process is a world in which prospects and coaches 
anticipate that one or the other may not honor a verbal commitment. 
A coach may revoke a scholarship offer because the coach receives an 
oral commitment from an athlete who the coach believes has more 
promising athletic potential.149 A coach may also revoke a 
scholarship if the coach believes a recruit is not committed, because 
the recruit may have expressed interest in another program.150 Often a 
recruit will express such an interest as a safeguard against the 
possibility that his or her scholarship offer might be withdrawn.151 
Coaches argue that institutions are disadvantaged when recruits fail 
to honor verbal commitments.152 They assert that oftentimes an 
institution will cease recruitment of other prospects with comparable 
skills based on their belief that the prospect will honor his or her 
commitment and sign with the institution.153 Coaches also argue that 
	
148 See supra text accompanying notes 104–08. 
149 Alfred C. Yen, Early Scholarship Offers and the NCAA, 52 B.C. L. REV. 585, 589–
90 (2011). 
150 Id. at 605–06. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 604 (noting broken promises impose meaningful costs on both institutions and 
recruits). 
153 Randy Rodgers, Inside the Verbal Commitment Circle, RIVALS.COM (Jan. 23, 2006), 
http://studentsports.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=504616. 
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although it is likely that a coach will have the opportunity to sign 
other prospects, there may be great disparities in talent if coaches are 
forced to rely on secondary and tertiary options in recruiting.154 
On the other hand, institutions’ revocation of scholarship offers has 
been criticized as placing a recruit in a more precarious situation than 
a university when he or she reneges on an oral commitment to sign a 
NLI. 
A school that loses a recruit can usually replace him or her with 
another recruit, someone from the existing roster, or even a recruit 
from a future year. 
 In short, to use the jargon of risk aversion, recruits suffer more 
than schools from the possibility of broken early commitments 
because recruits cannot effectively manage the risk of 
disappointment through diversification. Recruits are one-time 
players in the early commitment game, and those who try to court 
multiple prospects actually damage their chances of keeping 
commitments they have. By contrast, schools are repeat players 
who easily diversify risk over multiple recruits and multiple 
recruiting years. Accordingly, coaches may worry that early recruits 
will break their commitments, but they know that they will not 
suffer catastrophic consequences because alternate plans will have 
been made. Recruits have no such luxury.155 
Sentiments similar to the foregoing have prompted commentators to 
urge the NCAA to take action to regulate oral scholarship offers, the 
time when athletes can sign NLIs, and the revocation of scholarship 
offers.156 Nevertheless, the NCAA has failed to enact legislation to 
directly or indirectly regulate this aspect of the recruiting process. 
c. Over-Signing Student-Athletes 
The NCAA has, however, taken action to regulate another aspect 
of recruiting: over-signing, which also provokes concerns relating to 
the vulnerability of prospective student-athletes in the recruiting 
process. Over-signing, which historically occurred principally in 
college football, occurs when a college or university signs more 
student-athletes to NLIs or offers of financial assistance than the 
institution can honor and still remain in compliance with NCAA 
rules. For Football Bowl Subdivision Schools (FBS), NCAA rules 
	
154 See Jaime Y. Nomura, Refereeing the Recruiting Game: Applying Contract Law to 
Make the Intercollegiate Recruiting Process Fair, 32 U. HAW. L. REV. 275, 281–82 (2009) 
(noting the difficulty an institution may encounter in trying to find a comparable talent 
when a recruited athlete de-commits late in the recruiting season). 
155 Yen, supra note 149, at 606 (footnotes omitted). 
156 Id. at 585–616; Nomura, supra note 154, at 304. 
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impose an annual limit of twenty-five on the number of scholarships 
that can be awarded to incoming student-athletes.157 This limitation 
operates in concert with the NCAA’s limitation on the total number of 
football scholarships, eighty-five, that can be awarded per year.158 
Prior to the NCAA’s enactment of legislation discussed later in this 
section,159 coaches willingly ran the risk of signing prospective 
student-athletes to more NLIs or offers of financial aid than a college 
possessed because doing so served the interests of coaches in that 
over-signing (1) provided coaches with a safeguard against a recruited 
prospect who could not sign a NLI because he or she was 
academically ineligible to receive an athletic scholarship under 
NCAA rules;160 (2) gave coaches a form of insurance, protecting 
them against the possibility that a recruited athlete might forfeit his or 
her amateur status by having committed a violation of NCAA 
amateurism rules;161 (3) facilitated a coach’s ability to have players in 
reserve if a highly desired recruit elected to attend another college; 
and (4) afforded coaches a supply of incoming student-athletes to 
replace other athletes whose athletic scholarship a coach had decided 
not to renew because the coach believed the athlete had 
underperformed athletically.162 The quest for a competitive advantage 
also prompted over-signing. “Coaches love oversigning because it 
gives them more talent to choose from, [and] keeps [recruits] out of 
the hands of competitors . . . .”163 Another commentator suggests, 
“[t]he coaches who signed more players ha[ve] a chance to erase their 
mistakes. The coaches who signed fewer ha[ve] to live with their 
mistakes. That certainly seems like a competitive advantage.”164 In 
short, coaches over-signed in order to have backup student-athletes 
available to guard against the occurrence of one of the above 
scenarios. 
	
157 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.5.6.1. 
158 Id. See generally Jonathan D. Bateman, When the Numbers Don’t Add Up: 
Oversigning in College Football, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 7 (2011) (providing a 
detailed discussion of over-signing). 
159 See infra text accompanying notes 176–82. 
160 Bateman, supra note 158, at 11. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Hannah Karp & Darren Everson, SEC Coaches Defend ‘Oversigning,’ WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487044446045761729541 
87357370.html. 
164 Andy Staples, Oversigning Offenders Won’t Be Curbed by NCAA’s Toothless Rule, 
SI.COM (Jan. 24, 2011, 5:29 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/andy 
_staples/01/24/oversigning/index.html. 
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Prior to the NCAA’s over-signing legislation, if the anticipated 
attrition failed to occur, over-signed recruits as well as student-
athletes already on the roster from the previous season were placed in 
precarious positions. If none of the above-described scenarios 
occurred, the coach had to get rid of players. A coach can get rid of 
players in various ways. A coach could release a recruit from his or 
her NLI. However, a more likely scenario is “grayshirting,” which 
occurs when a coach requests that a recruit delay his or her enrollment 
with the hope that a scholarship would become available.165 
Similarly, coaches can request that recruits matriculate at the college 
or university and absorb the costs of attendance in anticipation that 
recruits would be awarded a scholarship in the future. This practice 
often occurs in tandem with coaches requesting that players walk-on 
to the team without receiving the scholarship the coach promised 
when the athlete was recruited. Another tactic is to encourage athletes 
already on the team to take a medical redshirt; this practice frees up 
the injured athlete’s scholarship while allowing the school to grant 
him or her a medical scholarship, which does not count against the 
NCAA scholarship limits.166 Finally, the coach might refuse to renew 
the scholarship of roster players to encourage them to transfer to other 
institutions.167 
Over-signing has been criticized as being immoral and a possible 
violation of athletes’ legal rights.168 University of Florida President J. 
Bernard Machen condemned the practice as follows: 
The universities, with full knowledge of what they are doing, extend 
more athletic scholarships than they have. These schools play 
	
165 Greg Johnson, Football Issues Committee to Monitor Oversigning, NCAA.ORG 
(Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest 
+News/2011/March/Football+Issues+Committee+to+monitor+oversigning (discussing 
grayshirting). 
166 Hannah Karp & Darren Everson, Alabama’s Unhappy Castoffs, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
24, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703384204575509901468451 
306.html (reporting that some athletes have complained that they were forced to take 
medical redshirts even though the athletes were not so incapacitated that they could not 
compete); Hannah Karp, Former Players Say Saban Twisted the Truth, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
25, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870424390457563059343879 
3612.html (discussing the negative repercussions of over-signing for athletes). 
167 Kelly Whiteside, New Rule Fails to Curb Oversigning, USATODAY (Feb. 1, 2011, 
9:34 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/SPORTS/usaedition/2011-02-01-oversign01 
_ST_U.htm. 
168 John Infante, Oversigning and NCAA Federalism, NCAA BYLAW BLOG (June 13, 
2011), www.ncaa.org/blog/2011/06/oversigning-and-ncaa-federalism (describing over-
signing as an unethical practice, in part, because a coach is making a promise that he can’t 
keep). 
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roulette with the lives of talented young people. If they run out of 
scholarships, too bad. The letter-of-intent signed by the university 
the previous February is voided. Technically, it’s legal to do this. 
Morally, it is reprehensible.169 
Commenting on the knowledge gap, one writer observed that in the 
past, “when top high-school seniors [made] their college 
commitments, dozens of signees headed to some of the nation’s most 
chronically over-signed schools were either unconcerned, or unaware, 
that these schools may have to cut some players to balance their 
lopsided books.”170 As is true when scholarship offers are revoked, an 
over-signed recruit is particularly vulnerable when he or she receives 
news from a coach that roster limitations would prevent the recruit 
from making the team. Often, opportunities for an athlete to sign a 
NLI with another school have evaporated. Finally, over-signing 
jeopardized the interest of student-athletes who were cut to make 
room for a new recruit.171 These concerns and the perceived 
unfairness of over-signing led certain athletic conferences to ban the 
practice, a step taken by the Big Ten Athletic Conference in 1956.172 
Legal recourse was not a realistic option for the over-signed 
recruit. If an institution and athlete had only signed a NLI without a 
financial aid commitment, the athlete would have no legal cause of 
action, such as a breach of contract claim, against his institution.173 
On the other hand, if an athlete signed an offer of financial aid and the 
school refused to honor it because of over-signing, the athlete would 
have a breach of contract action.174 The odds of an athlete pursuing 
such an action, however, would have been remote for reasons 
including (1) a lack of awareness by athletes of their legal rights; (2) 
the time investment involved in pursuing a cause of action; (3) the 
recovery from such an action, which would more than likely be 
limited to the value of a one-year scholarship (this of course would 
not be the case under a regime that allows for multiyear scholarships); 
and (4) the stigma attached to an athlete who challenged the 
	
169 J. Bernard Machen, Florida President: Grayshirting is Morally Reprehensible 
Practice, SI.COM (Feb. 1, 2011, 11:10 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/football 
/ncaa/01/31/bernard.machen.letter/index.html. 
170 Karp & Everson, supra note 163. 
171 Gregg Doyel, Bad Guys Utilize Over-Signing, and it Has to Stop, CBSSPORTS.COM 
(April 8, 2010), http://fantasynews.cbssports.com/columns/story/13727507. 
172 Staples, supra note 164. 
173 See supra text accompanying notes 104–08. 
174 See Bateman, supra note 158. 
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system.175 Thus, from an athlete’s perspective, it might be wiser to 
either accept an offer from another school or to simply wait and hope 
to get a scholarship from the team that subjected him or her to over-
signing. 
To address concerns relating to over-signing, the NCAA modified 
its recruiting rules. The NCAA initially adopted a rule that was 
applicable to FBS institutions.176 The rule imposed a yearly limit of 
twenty-eight on the number of prospective student-athletes with 
whom an institution could sign a NLI or an offer of financial aid.177 
Responding to criticism that this rule was ineffective in 
circumscribing over-signing and the harm caused by it,178 the NCAA, 
in 2012, approved more restrictive legislation intended to curb the 
practice of over-signing. It provides as follows: In bowl subdivision 
football, there shall be an annual limit of twenty-five on the number 
of prospective student-athletes who may sign a NLI or an institutional 
offer of financial aid from December 1 through May 31.179 
Additionally, a prospective student-athlete who signs a NLI or an 
institutional offer of financial aid and becomes an initial counter for 
the same academic year in which the signing occurred (e.g., midyear 
enrollee) shall not count toward the annual limit on signings.180 
In articulating the rationale for the rule, which became effective 
August 1, 2012, the NCAA stated: 
 This proposal seeks to address concerns regarding [] the practice 
of “over-signing” football prospective student-athletes to National 
Letters of Intent or financial aid agreements. Reducing the signing 
limit from 28 to 25 is an appropriate step to focus recruitment and 
signing of prospective student-athletes to the Football Bowl 
Subdivision limit on initial counters. By limiting the number of 
signees, institutions will be encouraged to focus their recruiting 
	
175 See id. 
176 To be classified as an NCAA Division I FBS institution, a school must play varsity 
football, offer up to eighty-five football scholarships, and participate in postseason play 
outside the auspices of the NCAA. NCAA, About the NCAA: Membership, NCAA.ORG, 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/Membership+N
EW (last updated Aug. 13, 2012). 
177 2010-11 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 112, § 13.9.2.3. 
178 Staples, supra note 164 (describing how a loophole related to the dates during which 
colleges could sign recruits to NLIs allowed the practice of over-signing to continue after 
the promulgation of the NCAA’s initial rule, and noting that the NCAA’s initial effort to 
curb over-signing was the result of legislation proposed by the SEC, which is identified as 
the conference with institutions that most frequently engaged in the practice). 
179 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 13.9.2.3. (“The legislation’s effective date was 
August 1, 2012.”).  
180 Id. § 13.9.2.3.1. 
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efforts on prospective student-athletes with the necessary academic 
and athletic credentials to succeed at the certifying institution.181 
The limitation imposed on offers enhances student-athlete well-
being. Although limited in scope, the legislation recognizes one of the 
harsh realities of college recruiting, which harmed not only 
prospective players, but also roster players whose scholarships would 
not be renewed to make room for new recruits.182 As such, the 
limitation on the number of offers that an institution can extend to 
players affords a layer of protection that ameliorates a pernicious 
recruiting practice. The limits imposed on over-signing are also 
consonant with a multiyear scholarship, which when offered will 
preclude a college from revoking the scholarship of a roster athlete in 
order to make room for an athlete who was over-signed. 
3. Financial Aid 
In 2011, the Student-Athlete Well-Being Working Group 
submitted for Board approval controversial legislation that would 
have permitted student-athletes, who had been awarded a full 
scholarship (i.e., tuition, fees, room and board, and books), to receive 
additional athletic aid equal to the lesser of the institution’s true cost 
of attendance or up to $2000.183 At the NCAA’s January 2012 
Annual Meeting, the Board of Directors unanimously approved the 
proposal.184 The impetus for the plan was a desire to provide 
scholarship student-athletes with funds to pay for miscellaneous 
expenses not covered by scholarships such as laundry, computers, and 
occasional travel to home.185 The chair of the Student-Athlete Well-
Being Working Group explained: 
We understand the situation of our student-athletes. This isn’t about 
paying student-athletes, but it is about being fair and recognizing 
that in Division I it ought to be important to meet this need . . . . We 
	
181 NCAA, NCAA DI LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS: PROPOSAL NUMBER: 2011-43 (2011). 
182 See Staples, supra note 164 (arguing that over-signing is harmful to recruits and 
roster athletes). 
183 POST-PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT UPDATES, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
184 Bryan Fischer, NCAA Board Nixes Scholarship Cuts, Supports Athlete Allowance, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (Jan. 14, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball 
/story/16873382/ncaa-board-nixes-scholarship-cuts-supports-athlete-allowance. 
185 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Board Pledges to Move Forward with Feedback from 
the Membership, NCAA.ORG (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect 
/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2012/April/DI+Board+pledges+to+move+forward
+with+feedback+from+the+membership. 
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all have lots of different choices to make, but we felt that these 
proposals are right for our student-athletes.186 
The notion that athletic aid does not cover the full costs of attendance 
for many student-athletes comports with research conducted by the 
National College Players Association, which found that “the NCAA 
restricts the value of the full scholarship to a level of compensation 
that is at or below the poverty level for the vast majority of 
athletes.”187 
The Board of Directors suspended the original legislation 
following strong opposition by NCAA Division I membership, which 
manifested in an override vote supported by 160 Division I 
institutions.188 Member institutions complained that giving student-
athletes additional non-need based aid would cause institutions to 
incur unjustified costs.189 Critics of the legislation also complained 
that it amounted to pay-for-play, which is antithetical to the 
amateurism principle, a core NCAA principle.190 Opponents also 
	
186 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Board Adopts Improvements in Academic Standards 
and Student-Athlete Support, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm 
/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2011/October/DI+Board+of+Directors 
+adopt+changes+to+academic+and+student-athlete+welfare. 
187 RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASSOC., THE 
PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE SPORT 3 (2011). 
188 Brad Wolverton, NCAA Weighs Changes to $2,000 Stipend Based on Financial 
Need, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 9, 2012), http://chronicle.com/blogs/players/ncaa   
-weighs-changes-to-2000-stipend-based-on-financial-need/29578. 
189 Id. 
190 Anthony Caruso, What’s Next? NCAA’s $2000 Athlete Stipend in Limbo, 
SPORTSENTERTAINMENTATTORNEY.COM (Jan. 11, 2012), http://sportsentertainment 
attorney.com/whats-next-ncaas-2000-athlete-stipend-in-limbo/. For differing perspectives 
on whether student-athletes should receive cash payments for their services, see Mary G. 
Miller, Comment, The NCAA and the Student Athlete: Reform Is on the Horizon, 46 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1141 (May 2012) (advocating the implementation of a pay scheme for 
student-athletes emulous of the Olympic model); Taylor Branch, The Shame of College 
Sports, ATLANTIC MAG. (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com 
/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/8643/2/?single_page=true 
(arguing that despite prevailing concerns regarding the preservation of amateurism, 
student-athletes are being taken advantage of and the commercialization of intercollegiate 
athletics requires compensation for these athletes); Seth Davis, Should College Athletes Be 
Paid? Why, They Already Are, SI.COM (Sept. 21 2011, 1:23 PM), http://sportsillustrated 
.cnn.com/2011/writers/seth_davis/09/21/Branch.rebuttal/index.html (opining that payment 
for tuition, room and board, books, and so forth is payment enough for student-athletes, 
and they need not be compensated more than they are); Kristi Dosh, The Problems with 
Paying College Athletes, FORBES (June 9, 2011, 6:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com 
/sites/sportsmoney/2011/06/09/the-problems-with-paying-college-athletes/ (identifying 
concerns related to paying student-athletes, including which athletes will be paid, how will 
they be paid, how much will they be paid, and Title IX implications of paying college 
athletes). 
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argued the legislation gave rise to gender equity concerns, was 
adopted too quickly to allow thoughtful consideration and comment, 
and would allow wealthier schools that could offer the additional 
scholarship money to stockpile student-athletes, leading to a 
competitive advantage.191 
In response to these concerns, the Student-Athlete Well-Being 
Working Group drafted a proposal that would allow up to $2000 of 
additional aid but only if student-athletes demonstrated need.192 The 
new plan also allows student-athletes on partial scholarships to 
receive additional aid.193 The NCAA sought comment from members 
on a plan that offers three options, which includes the need-based 
component.194 
B. Academic Reforms 
1. Overview 
In 2011, the Board of Directors approved proposals submitted by 
the Committee on Academic Performance (CAP) that sought to 
enhance student-athlete academic performance.195 The legislation 
imposes more stringent academic requirements relating to initial and 
junior college transfer eligibility and academic progress rates 
(APR).196 The Board’s adoption of more stringent academic standards 
	
191 Wolverton, supra note 188. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 The Board sought comments on these three options: 
 Allow each school to give student-athletes up to $2,000 of additional aid (not 
to exceed cost of attendance). In this model, financial need is not part of the 
criteria and student-athletes could receive the additional funding whether they 
were on full scholarship or received some portion of a scholarship. Alternately, 
those receiving partial scholarships could be limited to receiving a proportional 
amount of the $2,000 (for example, if they receive a twenty-five percent 
scholarship, they could receive $500 of the additional funding). 
 Base the eligibility for the miscellaneous expense allowance on a student-
athlete’s demonstrated “need” as detailed through the Free Application for 
Student Financial Assistance (FAFSA). To be eligible for the funding, student-
athletes must fill out the FAFSA. 
 Allow each school to use Student-Athlete Opportunity Funds, up to $2,000 
per student-athlete, up to the cost of attendance. Each school would be allowed to 
supplement their SAOF funds by up to $2,000 for each of the total number of 
grants-in-aid. 
Hosick, supra note 185. 
195 See Hosick, supra note 186. 
196 Id. 
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represents another phase of NCAA academic initiatives, since the 
1980s, aimed at ensuring a modicum of academic integrity within 
major intercollegiate athletics programs.197 
Before examining the new standards, we discuss a scenario that 
provides a backdrop to the Board’s academic reform efforts. In 1978, 
a highly-recruited high-school basketball player, Kevin Ross, enrolled 
at Creighton University.198 During his time at Creighton, Ross earned 
96 of the 128 hours he needed to graduate and enrolled in many 
classes (e.g., marksmanship and the theory of basketball) that did not 
count toward his major.199 In 1982, Ross departed Creighton without 
earning a degree, with a “D” grade average, and the “overall language 
skills of a fourth grader and the reading skills of a seventh grader.”200 
Stories of student-athletes like Kevin Ross, who competed in 
intercollegiate athletics on behalf of their institutions but who failed 
to develop academically, led to charges that student-athletes were 
being exploited for their athletic prowess. In response to such 
criticism and the public perception that academic values had become 
subordinated to athletic interests, the NCAA enacted what would 
become the first in a series of academic reform initiatives.201 The 
NCAA’s ever evolving academic standards legislation consists of 
several strands including (1) initial eligibility rules (a combination of 
minimum standardized test scores and grade point averages that 
entering student-athletes must attain in order to receive athletic-based 
financial aid and to participate in intercollegiate competition),202 (2) 
daily and weekly limits on the maximum number of hours that 
student-athletes can participate in organized-sports-related activity,203 
(3) progress-toward-degree requirements (student-athletes must take a 
curriculum that allows them to earn a certain percentage of credit 
hours in their declared major field of study at different junctures in 
	
197 Elisia J.P. Gatmen, Academic Exploitation: The Adverse Impact of College Athletics 
on the Educational Success of Minority Student-Athletes, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 
509 (2011) (providing an overview of NCAA academic reform legislation); Timothy 
Davis, supra note 111, at 759–64 (discussing NCAA efforts initiated during the 1980s to 
restore academic legitimacy). 
198 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 411 (7th Cir. 1992). 
199 Id. at 412. 
200 Id. 
201 See Timothy Davis, supra note 111, at 759–64 (discussing factors leading to NCAA 
academic reform measures). 
202 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 14.3.1. 
203 Id. § 17.1.6.1 (imposing four-hour daily and twenty-hour weekly maximum limits 
on countable athletically related activities in which student-athletes may participate). 
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their academic careers),204 and (4) the APR (a metric developed by 
the NCAA that is tied to a fifty percent projected graduation rate that 
each intercollegiate team must obtain in order to avoid penalties 
including a ban on post-season play).205 
Graduation rates have become the de facto metric for assessing 
whether the forgoing and other academic legislation have coalesced to 
improve student-athlete academic performance.206 Commenting on 
the importance of graduation rates, two authors state: 
 To achieve academic integrity colleges and universities involved 
in highly-commercialized athletics, particularly big-time football, 
must ensure that three academic values are maintained. The first is a 
college degree. Earning a degree is the primary measure of student-
athletes’ academic achievement. Graduation rates provide evidence 
that institutions are fulfilling the promise of a college education in 
exchange for athletic performance. It also evidences that institutions 
are recruiting students who are likely to succeed and not just 
athletes.207 
Based on graduation rates, NCAA academic reforms have produced 
measurable academic progress.208 
Even assuming that graduation rates are an indicative measure of 
student-athlete academic achievement, concerns persist regarding the 
balance between academics and athletics in intercollegiate athletics. 
For example, the gap in the graduation rates of African American and 
Caucasian student-athletes manifests deep-seated and troubling racial 
dynamics within college sports and may illustrate the prioritization of 
	
204 Id. §§ 14.4.1, 14.4.3.2. 
205 See infra text accompanying notes 239–42. 
206 Rodney K. Smith & Neil Millhiser, The BCS and Big-Time Intercollegiate Football 
Receive an “F”: Reforming a Failed System, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 45 (2012). 
207 Id. at 51. The two other values identified are student-athlete welfare, including a 
safe environment where steps are taken to minimize athletic injuries, and racial equity. Id. 
208 A 2012 study commissioned by the NCAA shows that the graduation rates for the 
2004 and 2005 cohorts were eighty-two and eighty-one percent respectively. NCAA 
RESEARCH, TRENDS IN GRADUATION-SUCCESS RATES AND FEDERAL GRADUATION 
RATES AT NCAA DIVISION I INSTITUTIONS, NCAA (2012) [hereinafter TRENDS], 
available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/pdfs/2012/2012+gsr+and 
+fed+trends. The study further indicates that the graduation rate of the 2005 cohorts was 
seven percentage points higher than that of the 1995 cohorts as a result of changes made to 
the initial eligibility rules in 1996 and 2003. Id. Walter Harrison, chair of the NCAA 
Committee on Academic Performance, attributes the upward trend of graduation rates to 
“the implementation of the yearly Academic Progress Rate; increased initial eligibility 
standards, and more stringent progress-toward-degree requirements.” Grad Rates Hit High 
Marks, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA 
/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+stories/October/Grad+rates+hit+high+marks. 
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athletics over academics.209 This concern is illustrated by an 
examination of the graduation gap between African American and 
Caucasian athletes who played on the teams that participated in the 
2010–2011 BCS football championship: 
The University of Oregon football team’s graduation rate was 54 
percent last year, but only 41 percent of its African American 
football players graduated. Meanwhile, 67 percent of its white 
players graduated. Auburn University’s graduation rate was 54 
percent, with only 49 percent of its African American football 
players graduating and 100 percent of its white players graduating. 
All the more disturbing is the fact that the University of Oregon had 
the sixth-lowest African American graduation rate and Auburn 
University had the largest racial disparity in graduation rates of all 
seventy bowl teams this season. What makes these statistics even 
more shocking is that of the 114 players on the Auburn football 
team in 2010–2011, eighty were African American. Of the 105 
football players on the University of Oregon’s football team, fifty-
seven were African American. Texas Christian University, which 
ended the year undefeated on the field, also had a respectable 
graduation rate of 71 percent, graduating 63 percent of their African 
American players and 85 percent of their white players, making a 
strong case for it being the best college football program in the 
country. While Auburn ended the year ranked number one in all of 
college football, they were eighty-fifth among all bowl eligible 
teams in the ranking that should matter most to participating 
institutions and their student-athletes–the graduation rates of its 
players.210 
Advocates for improving the academic success of student-athletes 
also caution that graduation rates can be misleading indicators of 
meaningful academic achievement because of practices that mask 
student-athlete academic deficiencies. One such practice involves 
academic counselors steering student-athletes toward “jock majors”—
fields of study that allow student-athletes to “maneuver through the 
maze of academic requirements and remain eligible to compete.”211 
As expressed by one commentator, “[t]he march toward tougher 
standards and, the NCAA hopes, higher graduation rates begs a 
crucial question, however: What do numbers matter if players are 
	
209 See TRENDS, supra note 208. 
210 Smith & Millhiser, supra note 206, at 54–55. 
211 Welch Suggs, Jock Majors, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 17, 2003), http://chronicle 
.com/article/Jock-Majors/32843. 
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being sent into academic programs that won’t give them a meaningful 
education or marketable skills?”212 
Of course, the question of clustering is not as simple as is perhaps 
suggested above and raises questions that warrant a more detailed 
examination. For example, does the acceptance of “jock majors” as a 
reality necessarily suggest that existing within our institutions of 
higher education are illegitimate academic programs that lack the 
degree of academic rigor consistent with the educational missions of 
colleges and universities? On the other hand, if a particular degree 
program has been vetted through established institutional procedures 
(e.g., curriculum committee, faculty senate), should a reasonable 
measure of legitimacy be assumed? Does the presence of a 
disproportionate number of student-athletes clustered in a particular 
major necessarily translate into athletes receiving a sub-par education 
compared to their non-student-athlete counterparts who chose the 
same major, or might other variables be relevant? Again, these are 
just a few of the questions that not only relate to clustering but also 
give primacy to the educational value as it relates to student-athletes. 
More stringent academic requirements, when combined with the 
economic benefits derived from successful Division I football and 
men’s basketball teams, may entice academic advisors, often because 
of pressure applied by coaches, to provide student-athletes with 
improper academic assistance that violates NCAA rules.213 Academic 
improprieties at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
(UNC) provide a recent example of academic fraud. From 2008-2010, 
a former UNC academic tutor committed major NCAA rules 
violations by providing impermissible academic assistance to student-
athletes.214 The tutor engaged in academic fraud by composing 
substantial sections of writing assignments for three student-athletes 
who submitted the assignments for academic credit.215 The former 
tutor also revised electronic drafts, composed works-cited pages, and 
provided outlines including thesis statements and substantive 
	
212 Id. For an examination of clustering of majors by football players see Paul 
Newberry, Examining Football Player Majors, USATODAY (Sept. 5, 2011, 2:26 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2011-09-05-1085948273_x.htm. 
213 See Smith & Millhiser, supra note 206, at 52. 
214 NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL PUBLIC INFRACTIONS 
REPORT 1 (2012), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/pdfs 
/2012/university+of+north+carolina,+chapel+hill+public+infractions+report+march+12,+
2012. 
215 Id. 
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material.216 Additionally, the former tutor committed a violation of 
NCAA ethical conduct standards by refusing to cooperate with the 
NCAA investigation of her activities.217 The NCAA imposed 
substantial penalties on UNC’s football program as a result of these 
and other rules violations.218 
Whether the most recently revised NCAA academic reforms will 
contribute to clustering or academic related NCAA rules violations is 
uncertain. What is clear, however, is that academic reform measures 
place a higher priority on academic achievement. We now turn to a 
discussion of this legislation. 
2. Initial Eligibility and Junior College Transfer Legislation 
a. Initial Eligibility Legislation 
In 2012, the Board of Directors approved changes to the eligibility 
requirements for entering first-year student-athletes and junior-college 
transfers. Under the new standards, in order for an entering first-year 
student to receive institutional-athletic financial aid and to engage in 
intercollegiate competition during his or her first year of academic 
residency, the athlete must have attained a minimum 2.3 grade point 
average (GPA) in sixteen high school core courses.219 Prior to the 
Board’s action, the minimum core GPA required was 2.0.220 The 
Board also increased the minimum standardized test score 
requirement. Based on the NCAA’s sliding scale formula that 
evaluates initial eligibility based on a combination of high school 
GPA and standardized test scores, the heightened eligibility standards 
require an entering student-athlete with a 2.3 core course GPA to have 
	
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 UNC Receives Postseason Ban, Scholarship Reductions, NCAA.ORG (Mar. 12, 
2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News 
/2012/March/UNC+receives+postseason+ban+scholarship+reductions. The penalties 
include: 
1. Public reprimand and censure. 2. Three years of probation from March 12, 
2012, through March 11, 2015. . . . 4. Postseason ban for the 2012 football 
season. 5. Reduction of football scholarships by a total of 15 during three 
academic years. . . . 6. Vacation of wins during the 2008 and 2009 seasons (self-
imposed by the University). . . . 8. Disassociation of [] the former tutor . . . . 
Id. Additional details concerning these sanctions are set forth in the UNC Infractions 
Report. Id. 
219 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 14.3.1.1. Core courses are academic courses that 
include English, mathematics, natural or physical science, and social science. 
220 Id. 
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scored at least a 1080 on the Standardized Admissions Test (SAT) in 
order to qualify.221 The previous minimum required a student who 
entered college with a 2.0 GPA to have a minimum SAT score of 
1010.222 Similarly, under the new eligibility standards, an entering 
student-athlete with a 3.5 GPA must have a 600 SAT score in order to 
qualify.223 Previously, qualifier status could have been attained by a 
student-athlete entering college with a 3.5 core course GPA and a 420 
SAT score.224 The revised standards also require student-athletes to 
have completed ten of sixteen core courses prior to the beginning of 
their senior year.225 In May 2013, the Board modified the 2012 
changes to the initial eligibility standards. For reasons discussed 
infra,226 the Board affirmed the increased GPA of 2.3 but restored the 
minimum SAT score of 1010.227 
In a significant change, the Board also adopted legislation allowing 
for academic redshirts. Previously, students who failed to meet the 
minimum initial eligibility requirements were deemed non-qualifiers. 
As such they were not permitted to receive athletic financial aid and 
compete in intercollegiate competition during their first academic 
year in residence.228 Under the legislation adopted in 2012, student-
athletes who fail to achieve qualifier status may not compete but may, 
if they meet certain eligibility requirements, receive athletics financial 
aid and practice with a team during his or her first semester.229 Again 
using the NCAA sliding scale formula, a prospective student-athlete 
would acquire academic redshirt status if he or she achieves a 
minimum 2.0 GPA and 1020 SAT score.230 This roughly correlates to 
the minimum eligibility standards for qualifier status prior to the 
	
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. § 14.3.1.1(c). The intent behind this legislation is to prevent athletes from back-
loading their curriculum and encourage taking courses in the typical fashion so as to allow 
them to build on academic prerequisites. See also Dana O’Neil, Eligibility vs. Academic 
Preparedness, ESPN.COM (Aug. 6, 2012), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/823 
6949/ncaa-increases-minimum-eligibility-standards-division-student-athletes. 
226 See infra text accompanying notes 250–52. 
227 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Board Retains Current Initial Eligibility Sliding Scale, 
NCAA.ORG (May 2, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA 
/Resources/Latest+News/2013/April/DI+Board+retains+current+initial-eligibility+sliding 
+scale. 
228 NCAA, 2011–12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL (2011) §§ 14.3.2.1, 14.3.2.1.1. 
229 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 14.3.1.2. 
230 Id. § 14.3.1.2.1. 
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Board’s adoption of the rule changes in 2012. Therefore, student-
athletes who comply with the pre-amended standards will not be 
denied athletics financial aid; however, they will not be permitted to 
compete. 
In justifying creating an academic redshirt status, one NCAA 
official stated “[t]he changes adopted by our presidents acknowledge 
that some incoming student-athletes need more time and assistance to 
be academically successful in college . . . . We believe the new 
standards will give more student-athletes the opportunity to thrive in 
the classroom.”231 Similarly, the NCAA’s Committee on Academic 
Performance, in proposing the recommendation to the Board, 
explained that “[s]tudent-athletes who need more time to acclimate to 
college life in order to ensure academic success will be provided an 
academic redshirt year without the pressure of competition.”232 The 
new initial eligibility standards for both qualifiers and academic 
redshirts will take effect for student-athletes who initially enroll in 
college after August 1, 2016.233 
b. Junior College Transfer Legislation 
Data demonstrates that junior college transfers often encounter 
academic difficulties after they enroll in four-year institutions.234 In 
an effort to enhance the academic preparedness of junior college 
transfers, the Board adopted legislation recommended by CAP that 
increases the minimum transferrable GPA from 2.0 to 2.5.235 The new 
legislation also limits the number of physical education classes that 
may be included in determining whether a junior college transfer has 
achieved the required 2.5 GPA.236 Finally, a junior college transfer 
who would not have been a qualifier out of high school must 
complete a core curriculum that includes English, math, and natural or 
physical science classes in order to qualify for athletics financial aid 
and compete after he or she transfers to a four-year institution.237 The 
	
231 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Inside the tougher academic requirements for freshmen, 
NCAA.ORG (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA 
/Resources/Latest+News/2011/November/Inside+the+tougher+academic+requirements 
+for+freshmen. 
232 POST-PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT UPDATES, supra note 9, at 8. 
233 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 14.3.1.1.2, 14.3.1.2.1. 
234 Thomas S. Paskus, A Summary and Commentary on the Quantitative Results of 
Current NCAA Academic Reforms, 5 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 41, 45 (2012). 
235 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 14.5.4.1. 
236 Id. § 14.5.4.5.4. 
237 Id. § 14.5.4.2.1. 
DAVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  11:32 AM 
120 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 77 
new standards took effect for junior college transfers after August 1, 
2012.238 
3. Academic Progress Rate 
In May 2004, the NCAA adopted legislation that instituted the 
APR. In commenting on the APR, then NCAA President, the late 
Myles Brand, stated “[f]or the first time, the NCAA will have the 
ability to hold institutions and teams accountable for the academic 
progress of their student athletes.”239 The NCAA calculates a team’s 
APR by examining each scholarship student-athlete on an 
intercollegiate team and determining whether the player has remained 
academically eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics and 
whether the student has chosen to remain enrolled at the school. 
Teams are awarded one point for meeting each of these standards 
during a given semester, resulting in each athlete earning the school a 
maximum of two points per semester and four points per year if the 
institution uses a two-semester calendar.240 After determining each 
athlete’s individual score, each team gets a final APR score; 1000 is 
the maximum APR a team can earn.241 
In 2011, the NCAA Board of Directors adopted a measure that 
requires teams to meet a minimum four-year APR average of 930 
(which corresponds to a fifty percent graduation rate) rather than an 
average of 900, in order to be eligible for post-season competition.242 
Although the new legislation takes effect in the 2015–2016 season, 
the impact of the current APR was vividly illustrated when a low 
APR average precluded 2011 NCAA men’s national basketball 
	
238 Id. 
239 Gary T. Brown, Division I Board of Directors Implements Historic Reforms, 
NCAA.ORG (May 10, 2004, 4:34 PM), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2004 
/Division+I/division%2Bi%2Bboard%2Bof%2Bdirectors%2Bimplements%2Bhistoric%2
Breforms%2B-%2B5-10-04.html. 
240 See NCAA, How is the Academic Progress Rate Calculated?, NCAA.ORG,  
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Academics+OLD/Division+I/How+
is+APR+calculated (last updated June 15, 2010). 
241 Id. 
242 Rob Dauster, NCAA’s APR Changes Could Cause Uptick in Fraud, More Problems, 
SI.COM (June 22, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/rob 
_dauster/06/22/NCAA-APR-changes/index.html; Hosick, supra note 186 (providing a 
detailed discussion of all of the changes to the APR). 
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champion, the University of Connecticut, from participating in post-
season play.243 
a. Assessing Academic Reform Legislation 
As in the past, legitimate concerns have been expressed regarding 
the NCAA’s most recent academic reform measures. In regard to 
initial eligibility rules, these concerns include whether (1) the first 
wave of high school students subject to the heightened requirements 
will be given sufficient notice to allow high school athletes and their 
parents to make the adjustments that will facilitate prospective 
student-athletes’ compliance;244 (2) the NCAA has overstepped in 
attempting to legislate preparedness, which is something that cannot 
be legislated;245 (3) the NCAA standards mandate a one-size-fits-all 
model notwithstanding a secondary-school system that lacks 
uniformity in course offerings and quality;246 (4) the new rules will 
prevent educational opportunity for student-athletes who, with careful 
guidance in college, overcome their academic deficiencies and earn a 
degree;247 and (5) practices will develop that enable prospective 
student-athletes to circumvent the new rules (e.g., enrolling students 
in high schools of questionable academic rigor).248 The changes to 
NCAA junior transfer rules have also been criticized as foreclosing on 
too many junior college student-athletes’ opportunity of transferring 
to a Division I institution. Critics also contend that transfer rules favor 
wealthier junior colleges that can provide the academic support 
services that will allow their student-athletes to meet the heightened 
transfer eligibility standards.249 
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Responding to these concerns, in May 2013, the Board jettisoned 
the increased minimum SAT score of 1080 and restored the current 
minimum SAT score of 1010.250 In reversing course, the Board 
expressed concern about the disparate impact of its increased test 
score requirement on ethnic minorities.251 It also reasoned that the 
increase in the minimum GPA, along with more stringent core course 
requirements and an increased APR for post-season play, should be 
sufficient to improve the graduation rates of student-athletes.252 
Notwithstanding legitimate concerns regarding the impact of 
academic reforms and the Board’s restoration of the current minimum 
test score requirement, heightened eligibility standards represent a 
significant step toward promoting meaningful student-athlete 
academic success. Indeed, initial eligibility rules are a subset of 
NCAA eligibility rules “designed to maintain academic integrity, the 
‘amateur’ nature of intercollegiate athletics and/or competitive 
balance among its member schools and participants.”253 The potential 
impact of the most recent academic reforms is illustrated by the 
results of a study, which estimates that if the new initial eligibility 
rules had been in effect for men’s basketball players who enrolled in 
college in 2009, 43.1% of them would not have met the standards.254 
Additionally, only 35.2% of football players and 15.3% of all student-
athletes would have met the standards.255 
Although the full impact of heightened eligibility standards will not 
be realized until after they have been fully implemented and can be 
assessed, tougher academic standards are likely to diminish the 
deleterious effect of one barrier—inferior academic preparation—to 
student-athlete academic achievement.256 Moreover, as was true of 
Propositions 48 and 16,257 student-athletes are likely to make the 
necessary adjustments to comply with the minimum standards. 
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Like other measures to enhance academic standards, the increase in 
the APR baseline has been criticized as leading to the increased 
potential for unsavory practices, such as academic fraud, as the 
competitive pressures of big-time intercollegiate athletics may 
influence athletes, coaches, and university personnel to do whatever is 
necessary to assist student-athletes in remaining in good academic 
standing.258 In addition, fairness concerns have been raised as the 
impact of the APR has fallen disproportionately on low-resources 
institutions, particularly historically black colleges and universities 
(HBCU).259 HBCUs accounted for thirty-three of the 103 teams 
penalized for low APRs in 2011.260 HBCUs also disproportionately 
represented teams that faced post-season bans for APRs falling below 
the minimum in 2012.261 Many of these institutions lack the financial 
resources to provide academic support services that will enable many 
athletes to succeed academically and thus to remain in good academic 
standing.262 The NCAA established a fund earmarked for assisting 
these institutions with their academic needs263 and has made special 
allowances for them.264 Along these same lines, factors such as 
limited financial resources and institutional missions, which tend to 
be more inclusive of underrepresented students, have been viewed as 
mitigating factors in appeals of APR-related penalties. Nevertheless, 
because of limited financial resources, teams at these institutions are 
likely to continue to disproportionately represent teams subject to a 
post-season ban and other penalties resulting from low APRs. 
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Notwithstanding such reservations, critics laud the goal of the 
enhanced standards and the promotion of education.265 Figures 
released in 2012 are illustrative of the positive trends. The overall 
four-year APR rose to 973, which represented a three-point increase 
over 2011 figures.266 Apart from student-athletes’ improved academic 
performance, the APR’s success can be measured by the way in 
which it has become a part of the fabric of success of Division I 
institutions. APR clauses are being incorporated into coaching 
contracts, “which give monetary incentives and disincentives for 
coaches who achieve or fail to achieve APR benchmarks.”267 
Graduation rates for student-athletes participating in the 2013 
NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament strongly suggest that NCAA 
academic reforms adopted over the past several years are having a 
positive impact. A report released in March 2013 revealed that the 
overall graduation rate for male student-athletes participating on 2013 
NCAA basketball tournament teams increased to seventy percent 
from sixty-seven percent in 2012.268 Overall graduation rates for 
African American male basketball players on these teams increased 
from fifty-nine percent in 2012 to sixty-five percent in 2013.269 
Although this is welcome progress and there has been a narrowing of 
the gap in graduation rates between African American and Caucasian 
players on the tournament teams, from twenty-eight percent in 2012 
to twenty-five percent in 2013,270 a large gap persists. Moreover, 
forty percent of the men’s teams had a Graduation Success Rate 
disparity in excess of thirty percent between Caucasian and African 
American student-athletes in 2013.271 Nevertheless, the report reflects 
positive academic trends. For example, eighty-seven percent of the 
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teams graduated more than fifty percent or more of their men’s 
basketball student-athletes and fifty-three percent graduated seventy 
percent or more.272 Another notable area of improvement relates to 
the APRs of tournament teams. Only three of the 2013 men’s 
tournament teams had an APR that fell below the current 925 
minimum standard compared to eight teams in 2013.273 
Dr. Richard Lapchick, the director of the institute that prepared the 
report, noted the remaining challenges, such as the racial gap in 
graduation rates, but emphasized the positive impact of NCAA 
academic reform measures. 
We are doing better each year. The academic reforms instituted in 
the past have worked. We need to raise the bar and move toward 60 
percent being the acceptable standard for the APR. Two thirds of 
this year’s team[s] in the men’s tournament are already there. The 
NCAA has started to do this by raising the APR minimum score to 
930 this year.274 
Neither heightened eligibility rules nor increased APR standards 
will, however, be a panacea for the academic tensions residing in 
college sports. To achieve their desired goal of affording student-
athletes a meaningful educational opportunity, these standards must 
be accompanied by measures that attempt to hold at bay other 
impediments to academic success,275 such as efforts by institutions to 
circumvent NCAA rules that limit the amount of time athletes can 
devote to athletic related activities. As noted above, once they arrive 
at college, student-athletes may continue to be clustered into majors 
where over-friendly professors may not provide them with the 
academic rigor necessary for them to take full advantage of the 
academic opportunities an athletic scholarship affords.276 Moreover, 
student-athletes must contend with the ever-increasing demands that 
athletics place on their time, often to the detriment of academic 
pursuits. 
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CONCLUSION 
In a world of highly commercialized intercollegiate athletics 
replete with academic and other scandals, cynicism abounds. And it is 
easy to perceive any effort by the NCAA to improve student-athlete 
well-being as merely a means of safeguarding the organization’s 
public image rather than promoting the interests of student-athletes. 
Understandably, NCAA reform measures are met with skepticism. 
Moreover, persistent issues relating to alleged inequities within 
intercollegiate athletics that deregulation and academic legislation 
have not fully tackled will likely contribute to the cynicism.277 In 
addition, new issues are likely to emerge from the legislative changes 
discussed in this Article. For example, economic and other issues may 
be spawned by the shift of deregulation from a competitive equity to a 
fairness of competition model. Increased levels of academic fraud and 
disproportionate impact on low-resource institutions may not only 
emerge from, but also be exacerbated by, enhanced academic 
standards. 
Nevertheless, the Board of Directors’ deregulation and academic 
reform legislation represents the beginning of a process that holds the 
potential to give rise to genuine change. With respect to deregulation, 
the Board must be commended for adopting proposals that are 
consonant with student-athlete well-being. In addition, the Board’s 
elimination or modification of rules viewed as inconsequential or 
unreasonable is also likely to enhance the legitimacy of the NCAA’s 
regulatory regimes.278 One construct through which to view the 
“legitimacy of laws refers to whether or not one agrees with the 
values that are supposed to be implemented and complied with. It is 
about agreement with those values, the perception that the values are 
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appropriate, right, and ethical.”279 Moreover, the attempted 
enforcement of unreasonable rules leads to adverse consequences, 
including resistance to compliance and the diversion of energy and 
resources from enforcing rules that truly matter. Thus, deregulation 
may enhance both compliance with NCAA rules and the overall 
legitimacy of its regulations and the organization.280 In so doing, 
deregulation may contribute toward a collaborative trust in the 
NCAA’s regulatory process by all intercollegiate athletics 
constituents, including student-athletes, athletics personnel, university 
administrators, and the public.   
As it relates to the NCAA’s academic reforms, student-athlete 
well-being is fostered if measures are embraced that contribute to 
successful academic experiences at the institutions for which they 
play sports. Empowering student-athletes to effectively access 
educational opportunities facilitates their acquisition of the elements 
of a college education critical to student-athletes, such as “(a) the 
refinement of personal competence, (b) the upward social mobility, 
and (c) the earning of a degree.”281 Viewed through this prism, the 
NCAA’s recently adopted academic legislation codifies measures that 
are consonant with both the NCAA’s education principle and student-
athlete well-being. Thus, academic reform legislation represents 
progress in attempting to lessen the pernicious intrusion of 
commercialized intercollegiate athletics on educational values. But 
the NCAA’s academic reform measures are only a starting point for 
achieving greater balance between athletic and academic values. 
Significant movement toward greater balance is ultimately a function 
of institutional commitment to foster student-athlete educational 
achievement and well-being, as reflected in the policies and practices 
implemented at each college and university with Division I 
intercollegiate athletics programs. In short, NCAA academic reforms 
are commendable, but ultimate responsibility resides with college 
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presidents and governing boards to adopt measures that “reinforce the 
educational missions” of their colleges and universities.282 
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